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In conflict resolution literature, the principle of all-inclusiveness, which calls for all 
warring parties to be included in a peace process for it to be successful, has become 
conventional wisdom and orthodoxy. This study challenges the principles of all-
inclusiveness by critically analysing problems related to issues of "inclusion" and 
"excl usion" of warring parties, as seen from a mediator's perspective. The literature on 
peace processes is examined in relation to five themes: The foundation for the principle 
of all-inclusiveness; the relationship between participation and the use of violence; 
consequences of exclusion; participation in relation to parties' characteristics; and 
consequences of all-inclusiveness. A set of questions are raised through which the issue 
of all-inclusiveness can be investigated, and on this basis, the 1998 peace process in 
Burundi is studied. The case of Burundi challenges the principle of all-inclusiveness as 
the process was successful despite the exclusion of several armed groups and highlights 
important dimensions for the question of participation. The central argument of the 
thesis is that the issue of participation, in particular its relation to success, is much more 
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"Since 1940, 71 percent of all civil wars have ended on the battlefield while only 29 
percent have ended in negotiated settlements",1 Although intrastate conflicts are 
particularly complicated to resolve and have "a particularly low rate of successful 
settlement, they have a remarkably high rate of attempted negotiation".2 
The difficulty of reaching negotiated settlements have spawned theoretical and practical 
studies that seek to identify what makes such processes successful, and the principle of 
all-inclusiveness has been identified as one ofthe major conditions for success. It is 
assumed that warring parties, particularly non-state armed groups, must be included in 
negotiations for the peace settlement to be successful, and the principle of all-
inclusiveness is an integral aspect of conflict resolution efforts.3 As a result, the principle 
of all-inclusiveness has not only become common knowledge but also orthodoxy in the 
conflict resolution literature. 
The principle of all-inclusiveness is the topic of this study, and the central aim is to 
critically examine the principle in order to question whether all-inclusiveness is a 
requirement for a peace process to be successful, and to identify central issues that are 
relevant to the question of participation of parties in peace processes. To this end, the 
study examines the literature and experience from cases regarding the issue of 
participation in relation to five themes: First, the foundation for the principle of all-
inclusiveness is examined. Second, the relationship between participation and the use of 
violence, and third, the possible consequences of excluding parties from a peace process 
are investigated. Fourth, participation in examined in relation to parties' characteristics, 
and the fifth part considers possible consequences of the principle of all-inclusiveness. 
1 Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Violent Civil War," IGCC Policy Paper, 1 September 1996. 
[Online]. Available: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1 a 13&context=igcc [15 
April 2008], 3. See also Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-
1993," The American Political Science Review 89, 3 (1995),681. 
2 Walter 1996, 3. 










Through a discussion ofthese five themes, a set of questions are raised, forming an 
analytical framework through which the question of all-inclusiveness can be examined. 
On the basis of the issues identified and questions raised, the 1998 peace process in 
Burundi is studied. A discussion of the Burundian experience highlights the lessons 










2. Problem Statement and Objectives of the Study 
Since the end of the Cold War, the majority of armed conflicts have been internal in 
nature, making it necessary for peacemakers to engage with non-state actors.4 In the 
same period, demands for democracy and human rights brought about the perception of 
armed groups as ({valid participants in any peacemaking process", and their inclusion 
hence became one of the informal rules of peacemaking processes. 5 It is believed that 
peace processes are likely to fail if armed groups are excluded,6 and the principle of all-
inclusiveness has consequently become dominant in conflict resolution efforts. In fact, 
the principle of all-inclusiveness is taken as "obviously valid",? as the following quote 
from Gardner is testimony to: 
"the case for strategic and principled engagement with armed groups needs 
no justification. It is necessary in order to achieve sustainable resolution of 
protracted conflict and/or secure humanitarian space. It is non-engagement 
with armed groups that requires justification. If the overall goal is to end 
violence and to find a durable peaceful settlement of armed conflicts, the 
international community requires the courage and will to get involved with 
all parties to a conflict".8 
There are three reasons to question whether this is always appropriate: 
1) Although Bloomfield, Nupen & Harris recognise that participation of parties is an 
important and difficult issue in peace processes,9 the issue of participation is rarely 
discussed in the literature on peace processes.1o 
2) As the quote from Gardner exemplifies, theoretical and practical claims about the 
relationship between all-inclusiveness and success are based on assumptions that are 
4 Lotta Harbom, Stina Hogbladh & Peter Wallensteen, "Armed conflict and Peace Agreements" Journal of 
Peace Reseach 43, 5 (2006), 619. 
5 Clapham 1998, 194. 
6 Judith Gardner, "Engagement of Armed Groups in Peace Processes," Report on Wilton Park Conference 
WPS05j34,9 -11 December 2005. [Online]. Available: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/engaging-
groups/documents/WP EAGPP report final.pdf [20 October 2007], 4. 
7 Clapham 1998, 196. 
B Gardner 2005, 4. 
9 David Bloomfield, Charles Nupen & Peter Harris, "Negotiation Processes," in Democracy and Deep-Rooted 
Conflict: Options for Negotiators, eds. P. Harris & B. Reilly (Stockholm: IDEA 1998), 71. 
10 According to Wall, Stark & Sandifer, studies on mediation are mainly descriptive and concerned with the 
following six areas: "the determinants of mediation, mediation per se, approaches employed by mediators, 
determinants of the mediation approaches, outcomes of mediation, and determinants of mediation 
outcomes". James A. Wall Jr, John B, Stark & Rhetta L. Standifer, "Mediation. A curent review and theory 










rarely supported with evidence. In particular, the principle of all-inclusiveness is 
founded on an assumed link between participation and a peace process' success that 
needs to be examined further. 
3) Contributions concerned with the question of participation are insufficiently nuanced 
and ignores possible theoretical and practical problems related to participation.11 The 
quote from Gardner is an example of this. 
On this basis, it is necessary to conduct a thorough examination of the subject. 
2.1 The central problem 
This study seeks to fill a gap in the literature by examining various issues of relevance to 
the question of inclusion and exclusion of parties in peace processes. The aims ofthe 
study are twofold: To examine whether an all-inclusive peace process is necessary for a 
process' success, and to identify central issues that are relevant for the question of 
participation of warring parties in peace processes. The key problem of the study is 
defined as the question of participation of warring parties in relation to the success ofa 
peace process, seen from the point of view of the mediating body. In order to identify 
central problems regarding participation and to examine whether all-inclusiveness is 
necessary for a successful peace process, the following research question is asked: 
What are the problems related to inclusion and exclusion ofwarring parties in a peace 
process, from a mediator's viewpoint, as illustrated in the case of Burundi? 
2.2 Case Study Justification: Why Burundi? 
Burundi is utilised as a case as it significantly questions the principle of all-inclusiveness 
as a prerequisite for a successful peace process, as the Arusha peace process, initiated in 
1998, was successful despite the exclusion of several armed groups. Although Van Eck 
and others have questioned whether the Arusha process should be considered a success 
despite not including some ofthe armed groups,12 the peace process significantly 
11 Clapham 1998, 196. 











contributed to the end ofthe violent conflict in Burundi,13 and should therefore be 
considered a success, despite its serious flaws and that challenges remain. 
It useful to consider Galtung's distinction between negative and positive peace when 
assessing the peace process in Burundi. Negative peace is defined as the absence of 
violence, while positive peace refers to a more in-depth consolidation of the peace 
through reconciliation, development of social justice, human rights and democracy.14 
Human rights, social justice and democracy should however be regarded as subgoals of a 
peace process, as such goals will depend on the successful accomplishment of bringing 
violence to an end. IS Negative peace is in other words a necessary foundation for 
positive peace, and a peace process is therefore successful when bringing about the 
"ending of civil violence and armed confrontation".16 
Establishing negative peace is no small achievement in Burundi, considering that the 
country's history has been dominated by violent conflicts since independence in 1962, 
and bearing in mind that the small state is surrounded by other conflict-ridden states in 
the region. It is significant that the Arusha peace process did not only become "'the only 
game in town,' but the agreement was "the single most important step forward ( ... ) to 
reverse the spiral of warilY The peace process in Burundi was therefore successful - in a 
negative peace sense - without having included all armed groups. 
There are five reasons for why Burundi is a useful case study: 
1) The intrastate characteristic ofthe conflict in Burundi indicates that is would be 
particularly difficult to bring to an end through a negotiated process. The peace process 
was successful and the case is therefore interesting to study. 
2) The peace process in Burundi did not adhere to accepted principles of peacemaking, 
but the process was nevertheless successful in bringing the armed conflict to an end. The 
peace pact, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, was signed and 
13 Kristina Bentley & Roger Southall, An African Peace Process. Mandela, South Africa and Burundi (Cape 
Town, South Africa: HSRC Press 2005), 192. 
14 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research 6, 3 (1969),183. 
15 George Downs & Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation," in Ending Civil 
Wars, eds. S. J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E. M. Cousens (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 49-50. 
16 Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace. Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1996),9. 










implemented without all armed groups being signatories to the agreement, and the case 
of Burundi therefore challenges the orthodoxy of all-inclusiveness.18 
3) The excluded groups continued to use violence in order to undermine the peace 
process, which sheds light on the relationship between participation and the use of 
violence. 19 
4) The parties who did not participate in the peacemaking process repeatedly split into 
factions,2o raising the question of how factionalism and splintering is related to the 
problem of participation in peace processes, and suggests that the Burundian peace 
process can highlight important issues in this regard. 
5) Several mediators were involved in the peace process in Burundi. These had different 
approaches to the question of participation and highlight various concerns and options 
that may present themselves in a peace process. 
In sum, the peace process in Burundi questions the principle of all-inclusiveness and 
illustrates well the various issues associated with the issue of inclusion and exclusion of 
warring parties on both practical and theoretical levels, and is therefore a useful case 
study for attaining a fuller understanding of the relationship between participation and 
a peace process' success. 
18 Van Eck 2007, 119. 
19 Bentley & Southall 2005, 191. 
20 All Africa, "Burundi: More Schisms Within Palipehutu-FNL," 11 October 2007. [Online]. Available: 










3. Structure of the Study 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter I sets out the topic and objectives of the 
study, gives a background to the theme and explains why Burundi is a useful case study. 
Chapter II identifies issues and problems that are relevant for the question of inclusion 
and exclusion of parties through five themes: 
1) the basis for the principle of all-inclusiveness; 
2) participation in a peace process and its relation to the use of violence; 
3) what the possible consequences of exclusion are; 
4) participation seen in relation to the characteristics of parties and 
5) possible consequences of all-inclusiveness. 
Under each theme a set of questions are raised that will serve as analytical tools for the 
examination of the peace process in Burundi. Chapter III discusses the peace process in 
Burundi according to the same five themes and answers the questions raised in order to 
identify lessons from the Burundian peace process. The central findings of the study are 
presented in chapter IV. 
The main argument ofthe thesis is that all-inclusiveness is orthodoxy in the literature on 
peace processes and that this principle should be questioned. A number of issues are 
found to be important for the question of participation of warring parties in peace 
processes, and its relationship to the success of a peace process is much more complex 









4. Methodology of the Study 
4.1 Questions of approach 
The literature on peace processes suffers from being insufficiently self-critical and 
claims made are often under theorised, and this is relevant for explaining the approach 
taken in the study. The concerns of Paris in relation to the literature on peace operations 
are equally applicable to contributions on peace processes. Paris has identified how the 
literature is "focused primarily on practical, policy-related issues such as the design and 
conduct of particular missions, rather than building bridges between the study of peace 
operations and larger theoretical debates in the discipline" of political science.21 He 
further asserts that theory, defined as "general statements that describe and explain the 
causes or effects of classes of phenomena",22 is being developed, but the literature is 
insufficiently concerned with "the broader implications ( ... ) for our understanding of 
international politics".23 A focus on practice and policy-related questions is useful as it 
"can help to identify circumstances in which peace missions are more or less likely to 
succeed"24 but in order for such an approach to develop reliable knowledge, it is crucial 
that the literature is sufficiently self-critical and based on evidence. 
Also the insights of Kleiboer, although focused on international mediation, are useful for 
explaining the approach chosen in the study. Kleiboer argues that the empirical 
examinations of peace processes are neither sufficiently developed nor specific enough, 
and identifies that the literature is ridden with conceptual confusion, [a] lack of 
specificity in discussions and absence of empirical evidence, which leads to knowledge 
being based on "conjectures, opinions, and ad hoc observations".25 The same problems 
are present in the claims made about participation of parties in peace processes and the 
study consequently seeks to improve the literature through examining the issue through 
a practical and critical angle. 
21 Roland Paris, "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations," International Studies Review 2, 3 (2000), 27. 
22 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 7-8, quoted in Roland Paris, "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations," International 
Studies Review 2, 3 (2000), 28. 
23 Paris 2000, 29. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding the Success and Failure of International Mediation," The Journal of 










4.2 Research Design: Form, Sources, Limitations, Reliability and Generability 
4.2.1 Form 
The study takes the form of a theory-testing case study. As no theory of participation 
exists, the study draws upon a range of literature on peace processes as a basis for an 
analytical framework for the examination of problems of participation, and an empirical, 
descriptive study of the peace process in Burundi serves to expand and refine the 
framework. The study falls within the category of scholarship that seeks to improve the 
quality of the existing literature. 
4.2.2 Sources 
The study is based on primary and secondary materials. A qualitative literature based 
study was found to be the most appropriate approach in order to meet the aim to 
identify important issues for the question of participation. As the existing literature does 
not provide a holistic and coherent framework for analysing the problems of 
participation, it was necessary to use a wide range of contributions in order to ensure a 
broad understanding of the questions involved. Contributions from different sets of 
literature have been utilised, and both general contributions in the fields of conflict 
resolution and peace operations as well as analyses of particular peace processes have 
been drawn upon to identify the various issues concerned with participation in peace 
processes. 
In the literature on peace processes, the principle of all-inclusiveness, the use of 
violence, factionalism and splintering of warring groups, consequences of exclusion as 
well as consequences of all-inclusiveness emerged as particularly central topics that 
remained unexplored from the perspective of participation in relation to a peace 
process' success. These themes were consequently chosen for the analysis of the 
problems related to inclusion and exclusion. 
4.2.3 Limitations 
Due to limitations in time and space available, the study is only concerned with the 
inclusion and exclusion of parties in relation to mediated peace processes' prospects for 
success. Ethical dilemmas in the inclusion and exclusion of parties, participation of civil 










representative and whether peace processes are democratic are issues not addressed in 
this study. 26 
In addition to the five selected themes, other issues emerged that would have been 
included if space and time allowed, such as whether the question of participation is 
different if the peace process involves a powersharing arrangement, and the importance 
ofthe timing of inclusion/exclusion of a party from a peace process,27 The latter two 
issues are interesting and deserve further examination in a future study. 
Similarly, not all topics raised in the literature in relation to the five themes were 
relevant for the question of participation and its implications for success and are hence 
not given attention in the study. For example, the importance of ceasefires in peace 
processes and the challenges posed by societal violence in a post-agreement phase are 
discussed in the literature on violence in peace processes,2S but these issues are not 
particularly significant for the question of inclusion and exclusion and consequently not 
addressed in this study. 
Due to time constraints and to ensure that the focus remained on the success of peace 
processes, the study is limited to participation seen from the mediator's point of view. 
Warring parties' considerations and tactics in relation to inclusion and exclusion are not 
given attention in this study but should be addressed in future research on the topic. 
4.2.4 Reliability and generability 
Although one cannot generalise on the basis of the findings from one case, a single-case 
study was considered suitable as the thesis seeks to identify the central problems of 
inclusion and exclusion in peace processes in order to improve the literature that serves 
as a theoretical basis for considering the issue of participation, rather than to find 
definite answers to all the questions involved. The study is intended to be a first step 
26 See Lorna McGregor, "Beyond the Time and Space of Peace Talks: Re-Appropriating the Peace Process in 
Sri Lanka," International Journal of Peace Studies 11, 1 (2006) and Frederic S. Pearson, "Dimensions of 
Conflict Resolution," Journal of Peace Research 38, 3 (2001) for discussions on peace processes and 
democracy, in particular on elite versus mass participation in peace processes. 
27 See for example Anna Jarstad, "Dilemmas of War- to-Democracy Transitions," Paper prepared for 
presentation at the conference State, Conflict and Democracy, 12-13 May 2006, 
Lund University. [Online] Available: http://www.svet.lu.se/conference/papers /jarstad.pdf [15 April 
2008]. 
28 See John Darby, The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 










towards an improved understanding of the topic and further studies will be necessary in 
order to identify findings with general applicability. A single-case study of Burundi was 
therefore appropriate in order to attain an in-depth understanding of the characteristics 
of the phenomenon. The descriptive study of the case draws upon the existing literature 
and does not aim to provide new information on the Burundian peace process. 
In order to ensure reliable findings, multiple sources from different sets of literature have 
been utilised. Contributions from organisations or other parties that are likely to have 
an interest in expressing specific views have been read with scepticism, which is 










5. Key concepts 
The following concepts are central for the study and should be defined. A peace process 
refers to "any formal or informal, private or public political process which involves the 
parties to an armed conflict working together to plan and undertake a process of 
dialogue and to reach and jointly implement any agreement from it".29 Such a process is 
often made up of several phases; "the ending of violence; then, negotiations leading to a 
political/constitutional agreement; and, finally, what is often referred to as post-
settlement peace building".3o although this process is seldom as ordered in reality as the 
various phases and activities of a peace process might "occur simultaneously and at 
different speeds".31 The term peace process is hence used as a way to describe this 
course towards conflict resolution. Peacemaking, being a phase of a peace process, is the 
activity of "helping to bring parties to a conflict to a negotiated settlement".32 Although 
issues of inclusion and exclusion relate primarily to the peacemaking phase, using such a 
definition would suggest that the problems with inclusion and exclusion of parties end 
as soon an agreement is reached. Also of interest is therefore the peacekeeping phase, 
which can be defined as "complex "multidimensional" enterprises designed to ensure 
the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the 
foundations for sustainable peace".33 The term peace process refers in this study to the 
peacemaking and peacekeeping phases of mediated intrastate conflicts. 
Negotiations "are talks that are held between at least two of the warring parties. The 
talks have to be connected to one or more issues related to the armed conflict, such as 
ceasefires, exchange of war prisoners, the creations of humanitarian zones" or other 
substantial questions.34 Mediation describes a negotiated process that is assisted by a 
29 Hugo Slim, A guide to mediation. Enabling peace processes in violent conflicts. (Geneva: Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue 2007), iv. [Online] Available: 
http://www.hdcentre.org/files Imediation%2 Oguidelines.pdf [15 April 2008] 
30 John Darby & Roger Mac Ginty, "Conclusion: The Management of Peace," in The Management of Peace 
Processes, ed. J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, N.Y.: Pal grave, 2000), 228. 
31 Darby 2001, II. 
32 Carolyn M. Stephenson, "New Approaches to International Peacemaking in the Post-Cold War Period," in 
Peace and World Security Studies, ed. M. T. Klare (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 2L 
33 United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping," ND. [Online] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpkol 
[15 April 2008] 
34 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Definition of Armed Conflict," ND. [Online] 











third party; "a voluntary process in which the parties retain control over the outcome 
(pure mediation), [or] combined with positive and negative inducements (mediation 
with muscle )".35 In this study, inclusion refers to the participation of parties in a peace 
process, while exclusion refers to parties being left out of, or choosing not to participate 
in, such a process. Engagement refers to "efforts to initiate or sustain opportunities for 
dialogue or practical confidence-building measures that may ultimately be able to 
address the causes and consequences of the conflict. It refers to an interaction between 
armed groups and their adversaries, or between armed groups and intermediaries".36 A 
~ is "a government of a state or any opposition organisation or alliance of opposition 
organizations",37 A warring party is defined as "an actor who uses armed force to 
promote its position".38 and the term armed group will in this study be used as a 
synonym. A successful peace process will for the purposes of the study be defined as the 
"ending of civil violence and armed confrontation".39 
35 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse & Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, 
Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge, UK: Maien, MA: Polity, 2005), 29-30. 
36 Gardner 2005, 3. 
37 Uppsaia Conflict Data Program. 
08 Ibid. 











Since the end of the Cold War, it has been considered necessary for all warring groups 
involved in a conflict to be included in a peace process for it to be successful. The 
principle of all-inclusiveness is common knowledge in contributions in the literature on 
peace processes and dominant in conflict resolution efforts. The validity of the principle 
is taken for granted, and the study aims to critically examine the principle of all-
inclusiveness. The study questions whether all-inclusiveness is a requirement for a 
peace process to be successful and seeks to identify central issues that are relevant to 
the question of participation of parties in peace processes in order to obtain a more 
nuanced understanding of the issue. The question of participation is examined in 
relation to five themes: the foundation for the principle of all-inclusiveness; the 
relationship between participation and the use of violence; the possible consequences of 
excluding parties from a peace process; participation in relation to parties' 
characteristics; and possible consequences of the principle of all-inclusiveness. Through 
a discussion of these five themes, a set of questions are raised, forming an analytical 
framework through which the question of all-inclusiveness can be examined. 
The study takes the form of a theory-testing case study. On the basis of the issues 
identified and questions raised through an examination of the literature, the 1998 peace 
process in Burundi is examined. Burundi is used as a case as it illustrates well the many 
problems involved and questions whether all-inclusiveness is necessary for a peace 
process to be successful, as the Arusha peace process brought an end to the armed 
conflict in the country without including all warring groups. 
A lack of self-critical and evidence-based contributions is a problem in the literature on 
peace processes in general and also in writings on the question of participation. The 
study therefore takes a practical and critical angle, and a wide range of literature from 
various fields are utilised to identify important issues in relation to inclusion and 










II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The following chapter examines the claim that peace processes must be all-inclusive in 
order to be successful and identifies problems relevant to the question of participation 
of warring parties. The chapter is divided into five parts: 
1. The principle of all-inclusiveness; 
2. Participation and its relation to violence; 
3. Consequences of exclusion of parties; 
4. Characteristics of parties; 
5. Consequences of an all-inclusive process. 
A set of questions are raised under each theme that will serve as analytical tools for the 










1. The principle of all-inclusiveness 
1.1 The meaning of all-inclusiveness 
The principle of all-inclusiveness is common knowledge and orthodoxy among experts 
on peace processes, as it is believed to be necessary to include all warring groups for a 
peace process to be successful. The meaning of all-inclusiveness is however rarely set 
out.40 For example, the United Nations Security Council stressed in 1999 that in order to 
achieve a "lasting peaceful settlement" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it was 
necessary to engage "all Congolese in an all-inclusive process of political dialogue with a 
view to achieving national reconciliation and to the holding on an early date of 
democratic, free and fair elections ... ", without specifying what an all-inclusive process 
entails.41 
The understanding of what an inclusive process entails varies also in practice. In the 
Northern Ireland peace process, the mediator George Mitchell made "inclusion" as one of 
the pillars for the peace process strategy, and "expanded and ( ... ) reduced the number of 
parties involved in the talks to those players that were, at least arguably, capable of 
functioning in a relatively centrist coalition".42 Mitchell's understanding ofthe principle 
of inclusiveness implied that parties who were able to push the process forwards would 
participate, and the All-Party talks involved "up to ten parties, including those with even 
marginal political support".43 Participation in the peace process was also conditioned on 
the party's adherence to a principle of non-violence, and parties with paramilitaries who 
had not committed to a ceasefire were excluded from the peace process. 
In other cases, participation in the peace process is not following a set principle but is 
based on a perception of who the most important parties are. Since 2002, the peace 
process in Sudan conducted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) was according to Young exclusivist as it was limited to the Government of Sudan 
and the armed group SPLM/ A. Young asserts that the inclusion of additional parties, 
'to Clapham 1998, 196. 
41 United Nations, "Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999)," 9 April 1999. [Online] Available: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN !N99 /101/73 /PDF /N9910173.pdf?OpenElement [15 August 
2008]. 
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both warring groups and political parties, could have given the peace process legitimacy, 
but the mediators believed that the participation of other parties would further 
complicate the talks, and the parties already included resisted sharing their resources 
and power with other groups.44 
The examples given above suggest that the principle of all-inclusiveness can be assessed 
more closely within the framework of the following questions: 
• What are the common traits through which an all-inclusive process is defined? 
• Does an all-inclusive process include absolutely all parties, or are some parties 
considered more relevant? 
• Does all-inclusiveness mean the participation of armed groups as well as political 
groups? 
1.2 Inclusion, ownership and success 
Although the principle of all-inclusiveness is repeatedly invoked in the literature on 
peace processes, the reasons for why all parties should be included are rarely provided. 
Contributions often presuppose that the inclusion of all parties adds value to a peace 
process a priori. An all-inclusive process is arguably synonymous with a "good 
process",4S leading to an agreement that is "good",46 while an agreement that excludes a 
party without justifiable reasons "must be considered a bad agreement",47 but no 
thorough rational explanation is provided for why an all-inclusive process is more 
valuable than one that is not. 
A central assumption in the literature is that a peace process that includes all parties will 
reach a more durable outcome. As Slim argues, peace agreements that are "owned by all 
parties are most likely to be acceptable to all parties, to be most effectively implemented 
and to last longest",48 and the statement by the Security Council claiming that "no 
44 John Young, "Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace," Review of African Political 
Economy 103 (2005), 101-102. 
45 Ron Kraybill, "Facilitation Skills for Interpersonal Transformation" in Transforming Ethnopolitical 
Conflict. The Bergh of Handbook, ed. A Austin, M. Fischer & N. Ropers (Wiesbade: VS Verlag fUr 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 13. 
46 Hampson 1996,217. 
47 Slim 2007,10. 










mediation initiative can be viable without ownership and full involvement of all relevant 
parties to the dispute throughout the process" is testimony to the broad acceptance of 
this idea.49 
It is similarly argued that an all-inclusive process enhances both the peace process' 
legitimacy50 as well as the participating parties' ownership51 of the process, and 
including all parties is therefore fundamental to the credibility of a peace process. 52 
Haysom, pointing to the South African peace process, suggests that ((an inclusive process 
provides a better platform for stability, acceptance of a new political order and loyalty to 
the nation".53 
It is seen to be particularly important to include armed groups in a peace process. 
Gardner suggests that ((principled and strategic engagement of armed groups is essential 
to achieving sustainable resolution of protracted conflict".54 In a similar vein, Hottinger 
argues that non-state armed groups will be more difficult to deal with if they are 
excluded from a peace process, a characteristic he asserts is, ((without exception, the one 
common denominator shared by all [non-state armed groups,] be they in Africa, 
America, Asia or Europe".55 
Although it does make rational sense that legitimacy and ownership of a peace process 
have positive effects on the implementation and duration of a settlement, and it seems 
logical that armed groups may challenge peace processes in significant ways, the 
argument that all-inclusiveness increases legitimacy and ownership, and in turn results 
in a peace agreement that lasts longer lacks supporting empirical evidence, and the 
validity of the argument for all-inclusiveness as a general principle is consequently open 
49 United Nations, "Statement by the President of the Security Council," 23 September 2008. [Online] 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf Icf 1{65BFCF9 B-6D2 7 -4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9}/Mediation%20SPRST%202008%2036.pdf [15 August 2008]. 
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Peace Processes, eds. J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 59. 
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Guide to Reaching Agreement, eds. L. Susskind, S. McKearnan & J. Thomas-Larmer (Thousand Oaks, 
California: SAGE Publications, 1999), 22. 
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to question. In order to examine the relationship between inclusion and exclusion and a 
peace process' success, it is necessary to ask: 
• Are agreements which include all parties more durable than those which do not? 
1.3 Conclusion 
Despite repeated calls for all-inclusiveness in the literature, there is a need to define 
what an all-inclusive peace process entails. Moreover, the foundation for the assertion 
that all-inclusiveness will lead to a successful outcome is weak and the principle should 
consequently be examined closer. 











2.1 Exclusion of warring groups 
Some contributions in the literature on peace processes suggest that it is not appropriate 
to allow parties who have used violence to participate in peace processes. Negotiating 
with groups who are responsible for human rights violations is arguably problematic as 
it implies an acceptance of "the validity of their demands and complaints, and rewarding 
them for violence".56 This view does not present a significant challenge to the principle 
of all-inclusiveness. The generally held view is in line with the argument of Slim, who 
suggests that engaging with individuals responsible for atrocities can be controversial, 
but "[m]ore often than not, such people and such groups will prove to be part ofthe 
solution",57 
While armed groups are today considered to be key actors in peace processes and the 
frequent inclusion of armed groups in peace processes is so prominent it can be termed 
"a trend", and although the implications of engaging with perpetrators of violence does 
not significantly challenge the principle of all-inclusiveness on a theoretical level, it is 
useful to identify if rewarding violence by including warring groups is a concern for 
mediators in practice.58 
• Is avoiding to reward violence an important concern for mediators? 
2.2 Inclusion of warring groups 
Use of violence may be a necessary requirement for a party to be considered as a 
relevant actor in a peace process. First, armed groups are often considered relevant 
partners in a negotiation process due to their use of violence. As Greig & Regan argues, 
"rebel groups must use violence as a bargaining tool to bring the government to the 
negotiating table".59 Secondly, parties that use violence are considered particularly 
;6 Dean Pruitt, "Negotiation with Terrorists," International Negotiation 11 (2006), 38l. 
;7 See Slim 2007, 10. 
58 Darby 2001, 118. 
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important participants in such processes. As Brahimi states, it is considered one of the 
key principles of mediation, and "straightforward and un-controversial" knowledge, that 
all parties that can hinder the peace process from succeeding must be inciuded.6D In a 
similar vein, Darby & Mac Ginty argues that "[a] lasting agreement is impossible unless it 
actively involves those with the power to bring it down by violence".61 
The argument that armed groups must be included for a peace process to be successful 
is based upon the assumption that armed groups will reduce or stop their use of 
violence when included in a peace process, and that this will in turn ensure that the 
process is successful. The relationship between inclusion and violence is not sufficiently 
explained, neither are reasons nor evidence provided in support for the argument, and 
the claim should consequently be questioned: 
• Does including a party prevent it from using violence? 
2.3 Violence a hinder for success 
According to Darby, "[i]t is not uncommon for a peace process to be overturned by 
violence even after an accord has been agreed to and is being implemented".62 This 
shows that the use of violence is a serious problem in peace processes. An example is the 
Northern Ireland peace process, where violence "undermined the significance and 
efficiency of the talks".63 
It is unlikely, however, that all types of violence, at all times, represent a serious threat 
to the peace process, and it is therefore legitimate to question whether the use of 
violence necessarily hinders such processes. According to Zartman, a peace process can 
handle some disturbing elements - an excluded party's ability to hinder a peace process 
from succeeding will depend on the other parties involved, both those included and 
those excluded from the peace process. What is essential, Zartman states, is that "the 
60 Lakhdar Brahimi, "Briefing to the Security Council. High level Debate on Mediation and the Settlement of 
Disputes." Briefing to the United Nations Security Council, 23 September 2008. 
61 Darby & Mac Ginty 2000, 266. 
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agreeing parties must comprise enough players to keep the remaining disagreeing ones 
from upsetting the agreement".64 It is consequently necessary to ask: 
• When does the use o/violence hinder the progress 0/ a peace process? 
2.4 Conclusion 
Several questions should be raised in relation to participation and the use of violence. 
First, although a concern for rewarding warring groups for their use of violence by 
including them in the peace process does not present challenge to principle in theory, it 
is useful to identify whether it is a concern for mediators in practice. Second, it is 
necessary to investigate the assumption that armed groups will stop their use of 
violence when included in a peace process, and that this will in turn ensure that the 
process is successful. Third, a more detailed examination of the relationship between 
inclusion of warring groups and their use of violence is needed. Although violence often 
succeeds in bringing peace processes down, it is necessary to identify when violence can 
derail a peace process, and when it does not present a hinder for its success. 
The following examines possible consequences of excluding a warring party from a 
peace process. 
61 William I. Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Resolution," in Coping with Conflict after the Cold War, eds. 










3. Consequences of exclusion 
3.1 Exclusion and spoiling 
Contributions in the literature on peace processes indicate that parties' behaviour will 
be affected by their inclusion or exclusion in the peace process. As stated above, it is 
assumed in the literature that warring parties to a conflict will be less likely to use 
violence if included in a peace process, and are therefore especially important parties to 
engage. Similarly, it is argued that outsiders to a peace process are more likely to 
become spoilers - "groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine 
conflict settlement though a variety of means and for a variety of motives" - than parties 
who are included, for three reasons.65 First, ideological reasons might prevent them 
from supporting the peace process, as "their survival may be premised on the 
continuation of strife".66 Second, the party might benefit financially from the 
continuation of conflict. Third, the party might fear marginalisation as a result of not 
taking part in the peace process, which would otherwise bring it power and 
influence.67 A party that is excluded from a peace process clearly has good reasons to 
become a spoiler, as it fears that the peace process will disregard its demands.68 Parties 
who participate in negotiations, on the other hand, have "a venue to express their 
demands and they are usually ensured some sort of political representation in the post-
agreement phase".69 It is therefore necessary to ask: 
• Does exclusion result in the party using spoiling tactics? 
3.2 Responding to spoiling behaviour 
The argument that exclusion will make a party more likely to utilise spoiling behaviour 
is reflected in the strategies suggested as appropriate for dealing with spoilers. Including 
65 Edward Newman & Oliver Richmond, "The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and Peacebuilding," 
Policy Briej2(2006), 1. [Online] Available: http://www.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-
briefs/2006/PB2-06.pdf [15 August 2008]. It should be noted that this is a broader definition than the one 
originally presented by Stedman, who defined spoilers as "leaders and factions who view a particular 
peace as opposed to their interests and who are willing to use violence to undermine it." See Stephen John 
Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22,2 (1997), 103. 
66 Marie-Joelle Zahar, "Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes," in Contemporary Peacemaking. 














an outside spoiler is seen as essential for a peace process to be successful, as the 
following statement by Zahar illustrates: "[B]uilding sustainable peace requires bringing 
the parties threatening to peace into the negotiation process (thus managing outside 
spoilers) and preventing them from developing incentives to renege during the 
implementation stage (or managing inside spoilers)"Jo 
As some spoilers seek to influence an ongoing peace process while others attempt to 
undermine it, the aims of the spoiler must be taken into account when deciding on the 
appropriate strategyJl One option is what Stedman calls the strategy of inducement, 
which implies meeting the party's requests, and the appropriateness of the inducement 
strategy will depend on the specific demands of the party involved.72 A spoiler with 
limited goals can be included in the peace process as long as "its demands are acceptable 
to the conflict's other parties",73 while for total spoilers, groups that "pursue total power 
( ... ) and hold immutable preferences", inclusion in the peace process will not be a 
suitable strategyJ4 A total spoiler's commitment to a peace process will only be tactical, 
and the only way to respond to such a spoiler is by defeating or marginalising the 
party,75 whereas parties that lie in between - greedy spoilers - "can be accommodated 
in peace processes if their limited goals are met and high costs constrain them from 
making added demands"J6 If a party's demands are not legitimate, Stedman suggests the 
departing train strategy, which "combines a judgement that the spoiler's demands and 
behaviour are illegitimate with the assertion that the peace process will go irrevocably 
forward, regardless of whether the spoiler joins or not",77 
The suggested strategies to address the problem of spoiling behaviour are faced with 
two significant problems. First, it is very difficult to distinguish between parties who 
seek to influence and those who seek to undermine the peace efforts. Darby's suggestion 
that parties who are willing to participate will, "under the right circumstances, [be] 
persuadable", is not particularly helpful.78 A second problem is that separating 
711 Ibid, 114. 
71 Stedman 1997, 14-16. 
72 Ibid, 13. 
n Ibid, 15. 
74 Ibid, II. 
75 Ibid, 14. 
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legitimate from illegitimate demands is both a difficult and subjective task. An 
alternative approach is to distinguish between parties according to their importance in 
the peace process. Stepanova, primarily concerned with spoilers using terrorist tactics, 
argues that one should separate spoilers that matter79 from small and radical spoiler 
groups",so and that these types of actors should be responded to differently. She states: 
"Challenges posed by major parties to a conflict that have all the necessary 
capabilities to undermine a peace process if and when they decide to do so 
require at least partial accommodation of their concerns, preferably as part 
of a peace agreement itself, and a strong emphasis on political 
transformation. In contrast, more radical "splinter" groups should be further 
marginalized and isolated ( ... )".SI 
Stepanova's distinction is useful from the question of participation, and suggests that 
although the aims of a spoiler should be taken into account, the party's ability to 
undermine a peace process should not be disregarded when deciding on strategy. In 
order to move beyond assumptions about the impact of different types of spoilers on 
peace processes, the following questions are useful: 
• Are parties included as longs as their demands are legitimate, regardless o/their 
spoiling behaviour? 
• Do mediators ignore parties (use the departing train strategy) who undermine the 
peace process and hold illegitimate demands? 
• Are parties being included, regardless o/their demands, if they are able to undermine 
the peace process? 
• Are small or radical parties marginalised in response to their spoiling behaviour? 
79 Spoilers that matter are by Stepanova defined as "major parties to a conflict that are not satisfied with 
the nature and/or handling of a peace process and do or may undertake terrorist acts to disrupt actual or 
potential peace negotiations." Ekaterina Stepanova, "Terrorism as a Tactic of Spoilers in Peace Processes" 
in Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, eds. E. Newman & a.p. 
Richmond (Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, 2006),90. 
80 Such groups are "often radicalized factions or offshoots of larger organizations that might have already 
signed or are likely to sign a peace accord or a cease-fire/confidence-building agreement." Ibid, 90. 
S1 Stepanova does moreover asserts that small and radical splinter groups should be marginalized "to a 
point when they could either be effectively destroyed (preferably by their own local rivals) or forced to 
leave the area and seek refuge abroad," and it is questionable whether this is a good solution to these 










3.3 Exclusion and extreme viewpoints 
It is suggested in the literature that parties who are excluded from a peace process will 
be more likely to take extreme viewpoints. Gardner argues that "lack of engagement can 
strengthen hardliners who favour fighting over negotiation and leave constituents feeling 
that armed conflict is the only way to achieve their objectives"8z and according to 
Ricigliano, this was the case for armed groups involved in conflicts in Nepal, Sri Lanka 
and Chechnya.83 In order to ensure a sustained resolution of a conflict, Gardner 
therefore suggests that all armed groups should be included in the peace process. More 
investigation is needed to identify reasons and evidence for the relationship between 
exclusion and ideological stance and for the claim that inclusion of the group will solve 
the problem, and the following questions are useful in this regard: 
• Do parties take more extreme positions when excluded? 
• Does inclusion o/parties with extreme positions result in the party holding more 
moderate views? 
3.4 Conclusion 
Contributions in the literature suggest good reasons for why an excluded party would 
want to become a spoiler, and it is necessary to examine if this is the case in practice. 
Whether including the party will be the appropriate response will however depend on 
the party's aims. In addition, it is suggested that one should distinguish between parties 
that matter and small, insignificant groups. It is suggested that warring groups are likely 
to hold more extreme views as a result of being excluded from the peace process. There 
is a need for more examination of the relationship between participation and ideological 
stance, especially whether including the party will solve the problem. 
Next, the relationship between participation and the characteristics of parties is 
examined. 
82 Gardner 2005, 4. 
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4. Characteristics of parties 
4.1 Willingness to participate 
Practical aspects regarding the participation of parties in peace processes can 
complicate the goal of having an all-inclusive peace process. Parties may not want to 
participate in a peace process or pull out of talks they are participating in. As Susskind et 
al. argue: "[F]iguring out who needs (and wants) to be at the table is one thing; getting 
them there is something else altogether",84 and several cases highlight this problem. In 
Sudan, the peace process stalled in 2007 as central armed groups boycotted the talks 
and the talks were postponed. Jan Eiasson, the UN's envoy to Darfur, in 2007 declared 
that consultations with the individual parties would continue, and "real substantial 
negotiations [would] start when the parties are prepared".85 In 2006, the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (L TTE) threatened to pull out of talks with the Sri Lankan 
government after aid workers had been "kidnapped at a Sri Lankan army checkpoint".86 
In Nigeria, negotiations between the government and some of the armed groups 
operating in the Niger Delta came to a halt in 2007 when the militias accused the 
Nigerian government "of military incursions and the arrest of [one oftheir] 
commander[s]".87 During the Cambodian peace process, Prince Sihanouk, described as a 
"key figure in the resolution of Cambodia's future", withdrew from the talks several 
times in order to put pressure on the other parties, for later to return to the process.88 
The contributions arguing for all-inclusiveness fail to address the complex question of 
parties' willingness to participate, and it is therefore necessary to ask: 
• Is it practically possible to have an all-inclusive process? 
84 Sarah McKearnan & David Fearnan, "Producing Consensus" in The Consensus Building Handbook. A 
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4.2 Party coherence 
Warring parties in a conflict are rarely unitary actors, which presents significant 
challenges for the principle of all-inclusiveness. Solomon highlights how parties to an 
intrastate conflict are not always easily identifiable: "[F]ighters are usually drawn from 
numerous political factions with diverging agendas, lines of command are blurred or 
nonexistent, and the battlefields are the very towns and villages where the combatants 
live".89 Parties are often "disparate, incohesive, and incoherent without a clear or 
coherent organizational structure, a single, well-integrated leadership, or a clear public 
mandate for action".9o The nature of the parties involved in a conflict will have 
important implications for the conflict dynamics as well as for the peace process, and 
especially for the question of inclusion and exclusion.91 
• What are the implications of incoherent party structures for the question of 
participation? 
4.2.1 Factions 
Ayres has identified how parties are frequently divided into factions along three 
different lines.92 First, parties can be split between the elite group and the masses that 
support them. Stedman's study of Zimbabwe indicates that internal political dynamics 
within a party are important for the outcome of negotiations, including the relationship 
between a party's leaders and its base.93 Second, parties in conflict can have a political 
organisation and an armed wing, which was the case in both the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC),94 Senegal,95 and Guinea-Bissau.96 Third, parties can be divided on 
69 Richard Solomon, "Foreword," in The Effects of Violence in Peace Processes (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), vii. 
90 Timothy D. Sisk, "Mediating Africa's Civil Conflicts - a User's Guide," in Out of Conflict: From War to 
Peace in Africa, eds. G. Sorbo & P. Vale (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), 183. 
91 Stephen John Stedman, "Introduction," in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, 
eds. S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 14. 
92 R. William Ayres, "No Peace at Any Price: The Effectiveness of Spoilers in Intrastate Conflicts," Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, 22-25 March 
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whether to support a peace process, and consist of one group being pro-settlement and 
another being anti-settlement.97 In Somalia, as talks were held in Djibouti in 2008, the 
party known as the Alliance split between members who demanded the departure of 
Ethiopian troops before being willing to enter dialogue and those who favoured talks 
despite Ethiopian troops being present.98 
A fourth factor not mentioned in the literature is that parties are not static actors. A 
faction that is pro-agreement might change its stance as the conflict or peace process 
develops, and it is plausible that the relationship between a political faction and its 
armed wing and between the elite and masses can change over time. Factionalism is 
common amongst parties in peace processes, and the orthodoxy of all-inclusiveness fails 
to recognise the challenges this may represent. 
4.2.2 Splinter groups 
Divisions within parties may lead to splintering and new parties being formed, posing 
significant challenges for the question of participation. In the DRe, the Democratic 
Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) split several times. One splinter group is called the 
Rastas,99 and disagreements within the FDLR's leadership led to another splinter group 
being formed: the Rally for Unity and Democracy-Urunana (RUD).lOO Leadership 
disagreements within the FDLR's armed wing, FOCA, "led to a splinter group named AN-
Imboneza, which joined RUD as its military wing".lOl 
In the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process in Sudan, the 
question of participation became a central issue and a point of contention when the 
parties who had already been acknowledged as valid participants to the process did not 
agree to the inclusion of the new parties and splinter factions, as it would imply further 
9; IRIN News, "Senegal: Rebel leader is dead but peace process may stay alive," 15 January 2007. [Online] 
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sharing of resources and power.102 The case of Sudan indicates that a complex landscape 
of parties poses challenges to peace processes and in particular to the question of 
participation, and suggests that a peace process that has begun may be disrupted by the 
attempt to include new parties into the process. It order to address the issue of 
factionalism and splintering in relation to the principle of all-inclusiveness, it is useful to 
ask the following question: 
• Do mediators include all factions and splinter groups in the peace process? 
4.3 Conclusion 
In sum, it is necessary to examine the issue of parties' willingness to participate in order 
to obtain a more nuanced understanding of the principle of all-inclusiveness. Moreover, 
parties are rarely unitary actors, and the nature of parties involved in a conflict will have 
important implications for the question of inclusion and exclusion. Examples show that 
factionalism and splintering is common, and the principle of all-inclusiveness fails to 
recognise the challenges this may present. 
Next, possible consequences of all-inclusiveness are examined. 










5. Consequences of all-inclusiveness 
5.1 The number of participants 
A peace process is much more complex than "a simple interaction between two clearly 
defined and well-articulated adversaries plus one mediating party",103 as illustrated by 
the Darfur peace process. In 2003, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan 
Liberation Army were the two main groups in conflict with the government. By 2007, 
the number of groups had increased to 28, due to "tribal disputes, geographical realities 
Coo.) and the lust for poweroo.",l°4 
As Sebenius underlines, "parties themselves are often important choice variables in 
negotiation",los Including a high number of parties in a peace process affects both the 
process itself and its outcome, as the more parties participate, the more difficult the 
talks become. Cunningham finds a strong correlation between the number of veto 
players - groups that have divergent views than other actors in the conflict, are 
internally cohesive enough to hold their position, and are able to "continue the war 
unilaterally if the other parties to the conflict reach an accord" - and the duration of civil 
war,l°6 A high number of veto players in a conflict implies that "there are fewer 
acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances 
and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult",lo7 and conducting a peace 
process as well as finding an outcome that is acceptable to all is consequently more 
difficult. 
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue in the DRC highlights the challenges resulting from 
involving a high number of participants. Rogier suggests that the content of the talks 
was gradually being narrowed to comprise only power-sharing, while "the number of 
contestants simultaneously, and correlatively, kept growing. Greedy warlords Coo.) 
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2007. [Online] Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/world/africa/31darfur.htm!? r=1&oref=slogin [15 August 2008]. 
105 James K. Sebenius, "Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties," International 
Organization 37, 2 (1983),281. 
106 David E. Cunningham, "Veto Players and Civil War Duration," American Journal of Political Science 50, 4 
(2006),878-879. 










managed to 'shoot their way' to the negotiating table, thereby increasing the difficulty of 
finding an agreement and impoverishing further the contents ofthe talks",108 and the 
dynamics became a "vicious cycle" in the process.109 In the Darfur peace process, a high 
number of participants complicated the peace efforts as the various movements 
involved did not speak with one voice.110 
According to Clapham, the principle of all-inclusiveness "does not facilitate problem-
solving between the parties and consequently reduces the chances of a successful 
implementation".111 In order to be successful, peace processes need a "transition 
bargain", a sincere agreement which has "the active support ofthe key parties which 
[are] needed to implement it, and which could where necessary be imposed on 
recalcitrants who might be tempted to disrupt it".112 By including a high number of 
parties, a weak result is more likely and the prospects for successful implementation is 
reduced, in contradiction to the idea that all-inclusiveness as a recipe for success. The 
following question should be raised: 
• Does a high number a/parties included in a peace process negatively affect the peace 
process and its outcome? 
5.2 Process strategies and effects on the landscape of parties 
Applying the principle of all-inclusiveness might encourage factionalism and the 
formation of splinter groups during a peace process. Cases indicate that expressing all-
inclusiveness as a goal may give parties bargaining power and foster the development of 
splinter groups. In the Liberian peace process, the goal of all-inclusiveness led to a 
"proliferation of competing factions" and the actual negotiations became more 
complicated,113 while in the case of Somalia, "efforts to include and accommodate 
everybody ( ... ) generated increasing factionalism and - intentionally or unintentionally 
lOB Emeric Rogier, "The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A Critical Overview," In Challenges of Peace 
Implementation. The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, eds. M. Malan & J. Gomes Porto 
(Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 39. [Online] Available: 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/CoPBookMay04/Contents.htm [15 August 2008]. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Gettleman 2007. 
111 Clapham 1998, 196. 
112 Ibid, 196-197. 










-left some complaining that they had been excluded",114 It is necessary to examine how 
the landscape of parties involved in a conflict is influenced by the principle of all-
incl usiveness: 
• Do a mediator's attempts at including all parties lead to factionalism, splintering and 
new party formations? 
5.3 Conclusion 
In sum, including a high number of parties in a peace process increases the chances for a 
weak result and reduces the prospects for successful implementation, in contradiction 
to the idea that all-inclusiveness as a recipe for success. Moreover, cases suggest that the 
principle of all-inclusiveness may foster factionalism and splinter groups, and increase 
parties' bargaining power. Applying the principle of all-inclusiveness may in other 
words complicate the peace process rather than ensuring its success. 
114 Ian Spears, "Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power," 











Although contributions in the literature frequently state that peace processes must 
include all warring parties in order to be successful, insufficient theoretical reasoning or 
empirical evidence is provided to support the argument, and a critical examination of 
the question of participation is needed. 
In particular, the following eight issues need to be further examined: First, it is 
necessary to define what is meant by an all-inclusive process, as experts on peace 
processes often call for a peace process to be all-inclusive without explaining what the 
characteristics of such a process are. Second, the argument that an inclusive process 
increases the chances of success is a weak one, based on problematic assumptions, and it 
is necessary to question the claim that including a party into a peace process will hinder 
it from using violence and that violence will always be an obstacle to a peace process. 
Third, parties who are excluded from a peace process have good reasons to use spoiling 
tactics, and it is necessary to examine if this is the case in practice. When considering the 
appropriate strategy for response, the ability of a party to challenge or hinder a process 
seems to be equally important as the party's aims. Fourth, the claim that parties are 
prone to become hardliners as a result of being excluded, and whether including the 
party will solve the problem, needs to be investigated further. Sixth, practical questions 
present the principle of all-inclusiveness with significant challenges. A high number of 
parties involved complicates the peace process itself, makes it more difficult to find 
solutions that are acceptable to all and reduces the changes of successful 
implementation, and one should therefore examine if the assertion that an all-inclusive 
process leads to success holds in practice. Seventh, party without a coherent structure, 
factionalism, splintering and new party formations complicate the question of who a 
party's representatives are and which factions, if not all, should be included, and the 
implications for the principle of all-inclusiveness should be further examined. Eight, 
cases show that the principle of all-inclusiveness may encourage factionalism and 
splinter groups, and it is necessary to examine how an inclusive process, or a stated goal 
of all-inclusiveness, affects the landscape of parties. 
In conclusion, the argument for all-inclusiveness is based on assumptions that are 










participation and success is more complex than recognised in the literature, and 
contributions ignore important dimensions of contemporary conflicts and peace 
processes that pose significant challenges to the doctrine. The following questions 
should gUide a further examination of the issue of participation: 
1. What are the common traits through which an all-inclusive process is defined? 
2. Does an all-inclusive process include absolutely all parties, or are some parties 
considered more relevant? 
3. Does all-inclusiveness mean the participation of armed groups as well as political 
groups? 
4. Are agreements which include all parties more durable than those which do not? 
5. Is avoiding to reward violence an important concern for mediators? 
6. Does including a party prevent it from using violence? 
7. When does the use of violence hinder the progress of a peace process? 
8. Does exclusion result in the party using spoiling tactics? 
9. Are parties included as longs as their demands are legitimate, regardless of their 
spoiling behaviour? 
10. Do mediators ignore parties (use the departing train strategy) who undermine the 
peace process and hold illegitimate demands? 
11. Are parties being included, regardless of their demands, if they are able to undermine 
the peace process? 
12. Are small or radical parties marginalised in response to their spoiling behaviour? 
13. Do parties take more extreme positions when excluded? 
14. Does the inclusion ofparties with extreme positions into the peace process result in the 
party holding more moderate views? 










16. What are the implications ofincoherent party structures for the question of 
participation? 
17. Do mediators include all factions and splinter groups in the peace process? 
18. Does a high number of parties included in a peace process negatively affect the peace 
process and its outcome? 
19. Do a mediator's attempts at including all parties lead to factionalism, splintering and 
new party formations? 
In the following section, these questions will be used as a tool in the analysis of the 











The following chapter examines the peace process in Burundi with particular emphasis 
on the issues of inclusion and exclusion. After giving a background to the conflict and its 
parties, and the Burundian process is discussed through an examination of the following 
five topics: 
1. The principle of all-inclusiveness; 
2. The use of violence; 
3. The consequences of exclusion; 
4. Characteristics of the parties; 
5. The consequences of an all-inclusive process. 
Under each heading, a discussion ofthe topic is followed by a response to the questions 










1. Background to the conflict 
The Republic of Burundi is a small state in the Great Lakes region of Africa. It is one of 
the poorest states in the world and with its population of 8.5 million it is one of Africa's 
most population dense countries,1l5 The population is made up of three ethnic groups: 
85% Bahutu, 14% Batutsi and 1% Batwa - often called Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 116 - and as 
the Twa constitute such a small part of the population, Hutu and Tutsi are generally seen 
as the central groups.ll? A series of related violent conflicts dominate Burundi's post-
independence history. In 1961, the year before independence, Union pour Ie Progres 
National (UPRONA) was elected to power,118 and not long after, political unrest, 
supported by the previous colonial administration, disrupted and culminated in a 
violent competition for control of the state,1l9 Coups and violent attacks have since 
dominated Burundi's history and should be considered as foundations for the current 
phase of the conflict. 
The conflict in Burundi is frequently being referred to as an ethnic conflict. An ethnic 
group is "a segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves or 
others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture 
and who, in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and 
culture are significant ingredients",120 "An ethnic conflict involves two or more groups 
who inhabit a common region, have many features in common, yet each perceives itself 
to be different, is seen by others as different, and where one or more of the groups 
115 BBC, "Country Profile: Burundi,"18 April 2008. [Online]. Available: 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhilafrica/country profiles/1068873.stm [15 August 2008]. 
116 Although these numbers are unreliable, they are generally believed to reflect the composition of 
Burundian population. Floribert Ngaruko & Janvier Nkurunziza, "An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in 
Burundi," journal of African Economies 9,3 (2000),372. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are the prevalent terms used 
in the literature on Burundi and will also be used here. The correct terms are, however, Bahutu, Batutsi 
and Batwa. Bahutu is plural while Mahutu is singular, Batutsi is plural and Matutsi singular, Batwa is 
plural and Matwa singular. Burundi is also plural, while the singular is Murundi. See Patricia Daley, 
"Ethnicity and political violence in Africa: The challenge to the Burundi state," Political Geography 25 
(2006),658. 
117 Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2000, 372. 
118 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Paul Nantulya & Tyrone Savage, Bui/ding Nations. Transitional justice in the 
African Great Lakes Region (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2005),4. 
119 Institute for Security Studies, "Burundi. Political System and History." February 2005. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.iss.co.za/afiprofiles/burundilpolitics.html[15 August 2008]. 
120 John Milton Yinger, Ethnicity. Source of strength? Source of conflict? (Albany, N.Y.: State University of 










involved has a strong sense of grievance (about cultural, political or economic 
resources)".121 
The following five issues are important to note when considering the conflict in Burundi: 
1) The differences between Hutu and Tutsi were shaped by the colonial powers' use of 
ethnicity for instrumental purposes. 
As Chretien states: "[S]ince the first contact with Europeans and their growing hold over 
the region's societies, the Tutsi-Hutu antagonism, in Rwanda and Burundi, gained 
practical priority and intellectual primacy".122 Prunier describes how the colonizers 
distinguished between the Hutu, Tutsi and the Twa when they first reached the Great 
Lakes region. The groups "shared the same Bantu language, lived side by side with each 
other without any 'Hutuland' or 'Tutsiland' and often intermarried. But they were 
neither similar nor equal".123 The Twa constituted 1 % or less ofthe population and 
"either lived as hunter-gatherers in the forested areas or else served the high-ranking 
personalities and the King ( ... )".124 "The Hutu who made up the vast majority of the 
population, were peasants who cultivated the soil. They had a standard Bantu physical 
aspect, rather resembling the populations of neighbouring Uganda or Tanganyika. But 
the Tutsi were something else altogether. Extremely tall and thin, and often displaying 
sharp, angular facial features, these cattle-herders were obviously of a different racial 
stock than the local peasants", writes Prunier.125 
Physical differences combined with the "obsessive preoccupation with 'race' in the late 
nineteenth-century anthropological thinking", led to theorizing about the origins of the 
TutsP26 The Tutsi were seen as "socially superior",127 and '''scientific' theories about the 
121 Jacob Bercovitch & Karl Derouen Jr., "Managing Ethnic Civil Wars: Assessing the Determinants of 
Successful Mediation" Civil Wars 7, 1 (2005), 99. 
122 Jean-Pierre Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa. Two Thousand Years of History (New York: Zone Books 
2003),281-2. 





127 Prunier 1995, 6. See also Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda" Africa 









'Hamitic' or 'Semitic' origins of the Tutsi were developed",12s and this was to have 
significant impact on the developments in Burundi and Rwanda. As Prunier argues 
about Rwanda, and is according to Bentley & Southall equally applicable to Burundi, the 
view of the Tutsi as a superior race impacted on how the colonial powers governed,129 
and had significant consequences for the population through the dissemination of 
((value-laden stereotypes", which in turn inflated ((the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and 
crushing Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority 
complex".130 The Tutsi image of being superior and the Hutu image of being inferior, 
combined with the political and administrative strategies of the colonial power to favour 
the Tutsi resulted in what Prunier calls a ((social bomb".131 
In Burundi, a ((sociopolitical hierarchy" consisted of a king and princes on top, levels of 
Tutsi in the middle, then the Hutu, and finally the Twa at the bottom".132 The hierarchy 
was fluid,133 but with centralization of power, relationships were ((feudalized; that is, 
rather than providing for possibilities for upward mobility by individual Hutu, they 
tended to become solidified and to reinforce unequal land and labour rights and duties 
to the advantage of Tutsi, who in effect 'established a regime of caste' ( ... ) and reduced 
Hutu to serfdom".134 This process was essentially a ((center-periphery affair", but as 
((elites were co-opted by the monarchy to be faithful servants ( ... ), the more they were 
'tutsified"'.135 Through indirect rule under the colonial period, Tutsis got the ((role of a 
natural elite who constituted a 'superior race,' an identification which to a large measure 
became internalized by Hutu, who were poor and powerless, and internalized their 
inferiority".136 
128 Prunier 1995, 8. It is now argued that "the Tutsi are no more 'Hamitic' than the Hutu, and that the 
physical differences which arose developed over time through occupational and dietary specialization. See 
Bentley & Southall 2005, 33. 
129 Bentley & Southall 2005, 34. 
no Prunier 1995, 8-9. 
lJl Prunier 1995,9. 
m Peter Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence" 
Comparative Politics 31, 3 (1999),255. See Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (New 
York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10-11 for an explanation of the 
relation between ethnic differences and differences in social status. 
113 Uvin 1999,255. Several authors describe divisions between Hutu and Tutsi as flexible identities. See 
Lemarchand 1996, 8-9 and Bentley & Southall 2005, 3l. 
134 Bentley & Southall 2005, 36. 
135 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 87. 










2) The differences between Hutu and Tutsi became the basis for political identification. 
The insights of Mamdani are useful in explaining how colonial rule was legitimized and 
justified on the basis of racial differences. By separating between ethnic groups in the 
organization of power (through indirect rule, in the sense that every ethnic group were 
organized under its own 'native authority'), ethnic groups became political 
communities.137 Instead of being divided into multiple ethnic groups, the situation in the 
Great Lakes region was one where Hutu "were not ruled by their own chiefs, but by 
Tutsi chiefs. Tutsi were transformed into a different race, 'strangers' and 'settlers'; in 
short, the hamitic race",138 According to Mamdani, colonial rule in the region resulted in 
the racialisation of the Tutsi/Hutu difference,139 and one can therefore say that the 
differences between Tutsi and Hutu are "historical constructs",140 used for instrumental 
purposes,141 and resulted in "Hutu-ness or Tutsi-ness" which led to the formation of 
Hutu and Tutsi as political identities,142 Hutu and Tutsi as political identities were other 
words institutionalized during colonial rule. 
3) The political identity of Hutu and Tutsi was further entrenched by the reinforcing 
pattern of differences combined with the zero-sum nature of the conflict. 
Since the colonial period, the political separation between Hutu and Tutsi has been 
reinforced through a pattern of differentiation. The Rwanda revolution in 1959-1961 
contributed to an increased intensity of the polarisation of the Hutu-Tutsi relationship, 
and since Burundian independence in 1962, Hutus were subject to a "systematic 
exclusion from the seats of executive power", which in turn promoted the rise of Hutu 
ethnicity.143 
1J7 Ibid, 38. 
m Ibid, 39. 
119 Mamdani 2002, 24. 
140 Bentley & Southall 2005, 37. 
141 See Lemarchand 1996, 5-9 for remarks on the difference between primordialist and instrumentalist 
ethnicity. 
142 Mamdani 2002, 24 and Bentley & Southall 2005, 32. 
141 Rene Lemarchand, "Burundi at a Crossroads," in Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region, 










Competition for control of the state has been central in reinforcing the divisions 
between Tutsi and Hutu, as ((the state was the main source of enrichment and power in 
society and conferred great opportunities to those who controlled it. Following the 
events in Rwanda, state control became the sole vehicle for the Tutsi to retain their 
privileges, while conversely it was the sole means of rapid social advancement for 
Hutu".144 Policies of exclusion in turn increased the importance of being in control of the 
state. According to Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, ((the state has been privati sed to serve 
interests of some overlapping networks which can be represented as concentric circles: 
the chances of success are higher for Tutsi than for Hutu. However, among the Tutsi 
ethnic group, the chances are higher for those originating from the southern province of 
Bururi, and are highest for the military Tutsi originating from this province".145 The 
exclusionary policies have affected access to economic opportunities and education, but 
most importantly participation in politicallife.146 
As Chretien explains it, the ((socio-ethnic antagonism, defined as structural, slowly 
crystallized into an obsessive fear: of a solution founded on a binary majority-minority 
relationship that would entail evicting one group or the other from the political 
arena".147 Through what Lemarchand has called a ((self-fulfilling prophecy",148 a pattern 
of repression and violence became entrenched,149 where the ((dramatization of [the] 
cleavage, with its all-or-nothing stakes, have been carried out through systemic mass 
violence".150 Political events were hence ((invested with an ethnic interpretation"151 and 
created a trap of ((politics ofrevenge".152 
4) It is essential to note that the groups involved in the Burundian conflict represent 
political categories rather than ethnic identities. 
As Prunier states: ((The Tutsi-Hutu conundrum is only the surface of the deeper 
economic limitations. ( ... ) The real problem is poverty ... The only thing that matters is 
144 Uvin 1999,256. 
14S Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2000, 382. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Chretien 2003, 312. 
148 Rene Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2009), 143. 
149 Lemarchand 2006,44. 
ISO Chretien 2003,313. 
151 Ibid, 313. 










power ... outside of government there is absolutely nothing in Burundi you can make 
money out of ... Out of power, you do not eat".153 It is therefore evident that "the 
Hutu/Tutsi binary has only limited explanatory value" when considering the case of 
Burundi. 154 
5) The conflict in Burundi is political in nature, and has been characterised by a series of 
violent political struggles, essentially about control of state power. 
Policies of exclusion and the power structure's lack of legitimacy resulted in a 
competition for power which essentially was one of resistance against domination. It is 
therefore accurate to say that the conflict is about governance in a broad sense, "about 
who is in political control at a particular point in time, how legitimate that control is, 
under what political system the control is based, under what political institutions it is 
operated, and how stable the political institutions are".155 
1,1 The current phase ofthe conflict 
The current phase of the conflict in Burundi started in 1993. In June of that year, 
Burundi's first democratic elections were held, which the Front pour la Democratie au 
Burundi (FRODEBU) won and a Hutu, Melchior Ndadaye, became president for the first 
time since decades of one-party rule by the mainly Tutsi party Union pour Ie Progres 
National (UPRONA).156 Signifying a peaceful transfer of power from the minority group 
to the majority, the election was understood as being close to a miracle, but despite the 
promising result ofthe election, violence soon broke out again.157 Within months, 
president Ndadaye and other leaders were killed in a coup led by a faction of the army, 
153 Gerard Prunier quoted in IRIN News, " Burundi: No peace without prosperity - analysts," IRIN News, 13 
November 200S. [Online]. Available: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=SI447 [15 March 
2009]. 
154 Daley 2006, 666. 
155Mohammad O. Maundi, William I. Zartman, Gilbert M. Khadiagala & Kwaku Nuamah, Getting In: 
Mediators' Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of peace 
Press, 2006), 5S. 
156 Villa-Vicencio, Nantulya & Savage 2005, 4. 










and as a consequence of the assassinations, Hutus attacked Tutsis158 across the country, 
and the army then intervened with brutality, attacking HutuS.159 
After the assassination of Ndadaye, FRODEBU, UPRONA and other political parties 
reached an agreement in which FRODEBU kept the presidency and Cyprien Ntayamira 
became the new president, while UPRONA and other parties controlled 60 % of the 
executive posts in the government. New challenges presented themselves in April 1994 
when Ntayamira died together with Rwandan president Habyarimana when their plane 
was shot down.160 An agreement reached in September 1994, the Convention of 
Government (CG), made provisions for the establishment of a coalition government led 
by a president from FRODEBU and a prime minister from UPRONA, and other 
transitional arrangements.161 The transitional government institutions did however not 
work effectively, and some Hutu politicians rejoined armed groups such as the Conseil 
national pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD), Front our la Liberation Nationale 
(FROLINA) and Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTUJ,162 As the army 
responded with attacks on civilians and the government requested a regional military 
intervention, Major Pierre Buyoya163 took power in a coup d'etat.164 
Regional pressure and sanctions followed, as did several regional summits aimed at 
finding a solution to the situation. Talks between the Buyoya II regime (so called as 
Buyoya also held power after a coup in 1987) and the CNDD culminated in the Rome 
Accords on 10 May 1997.165 The agreement with the CNDD broke down, however, and 
the Buyoya II government then sought to find an arrangement with FRODEBU, which in 
June 1998 resulted in the Internal Partnership Agreement, a settlement between the 
158 There were also cases of attacks of Hutu (FRODEBU sympathizers) upon Hutu (UPRONA 
sympathizers). Ibid, xiii. 
159 Ibid, xiii-xiv. 
160 Institute for Security Studies 2005. 
161 International Crisis Group, "Burundi Under Siege," Rapport Burundi no. 1,27 April 1998. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report archive/A400217 28041998.pdf [3 
October 2007], l. 
162 Ibid, l. 
163 Buyoya had also been in power between 1987 and 1993, hence his regime is often referred to as 
Buyoya II. Ibid. 
164 Buyoya was declared President by the army on 25 July 1996. He "announced the suspension of the 
Constitution, its replacement by a three year Transitional Decree, the suspension of political parties and 
his intention to launch multi-party talks." Sanctions were consequently imposed and in September 1996, 
the government stated that it would "reinstate Parliament and the political parties." Ibid, 4-5. 










government and the National Assembly dominated by FRODEBU.166 Buyoya, believing 
that this agreement would be the foundation for a new political order, agreed to start 
negotiations in Arusha on the 15th of June 1998.167 In 2000, the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement was signed,168 an accord that included provisions for an 
ethnically balanced government and military and set out a transitional period that 
would culminate in democratic elections.169 Central armed groups were not signatories 
to the agreement, but continued efforts to involve them eventually led to several 
ceasefire agreements between the government and the various groupsPo 
The Arusha agreement brought an end to the violent conflict in Burundi. A power-
sharing government was set up in 2001 and in 2005, parliamentary elections were held 
in which the former armed group CNDD-FDD won the vote and its leader, Pierre 
Nkurunziza became president,171 Although challenges remain, the 2005 elections and 
the successful integration of former government army and CNDD-FDD combatants 
"were major steps forward on the road to national peace and reconciliation",172 
166 Maundi et al. 2006, 81. 
167 Ibid, 82. 
168 Villa-Vicencio, Nantulya & Savage 2005,3-4. 
169 International Crisis Group, "Conflict history: Burundi." 2006a. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/homelindex.cfm ?action=conflict search&l= l&t=l&c country=20 [15 April 
2008]. 
170 Roger Southall, "A Long Prelude to Peace: African Involvement in Ending Burundi's War," in Ending 
Africa's Wars. Progressing to Peace, eds. O. Furley & R. May (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2006),201. 
171 BBC 2008. 
172 International Crisis Group, "Burundi: FinaliSing Peace with the FNL," Africa Report No. 131,27 August 
2007. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/central africa/131 burundi finalising peace wi 










2. The principle of all-inclusiveness 
The following chapter examines the issue of participation in the Arusha peace process. 
The first part gives a background to the Arusha process and sets out how the parties to 
the conflict in Burundi were considered in relation to the question of participation. As 
various mediators were involved in the Burundian peace process, the chapter next 
considers the question of participation according to three different phases of the peace 
process: 
1. The phase led by former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere; 
2. The phase under former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela; 
3. The post-Arusha process, led by the South African government, in which former 
deputy president Jacob Zuma had a central role. 
On this basis, the questions raised in the analytical framework are answered when 
applicable, in order to identify lessons from the Burundian experience for the question 
of participation and the principle of all-inclusiveness. 
2.1 The central parties - foundations for the Arusha process 
From the spark of the current phase of the conflict in 1993, Burundi received attention 
from various actors seeking to initiate dialogue between the groups involved.173 One of 
the central developments in the immediate period after the outbreak of violence was the 
appointment of the Special Representative ofthe United Nations Secretary General, 
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. He facilitated talks between the political parties, which lead to 
the appointment of Cyprian Ntaryamira as President in January 1994.174 New 
negotiations were initiated when Ntaryamira was killed, and 13 parties took part in this 
process which culminated in the Convention of Government.175 The involved parties 
17l Maundi et al. 2006, 66-67. 
174 The plane crash on 6 April 1994 killed both the Burundian president Ntaryamira and president Juvenal 
Habyarimana of Rwanda. United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi," 
United Nations Security Council (5/1994/1152), 11 October 1994. [Online]. Available: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN IN94/392/56/PDF 1N9439256.pdf?OpenElement [15 August 
2008],2. 
175 All of these, except for PARENA, were signatories to the agreement. Seven of the 13 parties were 










included UPRONA, FRODEBU and other political parties,176 but armed groups were not 
included in the talks.l77 As violence continued and Buyoya returned to power, regional 
and international interventions followed. In these engagements, warring parties were 
seen as crucial for bringing the peace process forward, based on the understanding that 
establishing a multi-party political system would be necessary.178 A condition for the lift 
of sanctions was therefore that the Buyoya regime negotiated also with "the armed 
groups inside and outside the country",179 Accordingly, an UNESCOI80 initiated Peace 
Conference in Paris in October 1997 saw the participation of almost all parties as well as 
armed factions, excluding FRODEBU.181 
By the time the Arusha peace process got underway in 1998, events and developments 
in the conflict had brought about an understanding of who the central parties to the 
conflict and hence relevant participants to the peace process were. 13 political parties 
had taken part in the talks leading to the Convention of Government but since then, 
significant changes in the landscape of actors had taken place and it was increasingly 
argued that the armed groups had to be included in the peace efforts. Essentially, as the 
Convention of Government broke down and Buyoya became President, the conflict's 
main actors had shifted from being the political parties to the armed groups. 
Consequently, "[a]lthough the major antagonistic political parties, UPRONA and 
FRODEBU, were still in the picture, the effective movers of the conflict were the army 
and the major militant armed group, the CNDD/FDD". The follOWing is an overview of 
the central parties and their support base: 
176 The participating parties were ABASA (Alliance burundo-africaine pour Ie salut), ANADDE (Alliance 
nationale pour Ie droit et Ie development), INKINZO Y'IGAMBO RY 'ABARUNDI (Parti d'opposition), 
PARENA (Parti pour Ie redressement national), PBS (RPB) (Rassemblement du people burundais), PIT 
(Parti independent des travailleurs, PL (Parti liberal), PP (Pardi du people), PRP (Parti pour la 
reconciliation du Peuple), PSD (Parti social democrate), RADDES (Ralliement pour la democratie et Ie 
developpement economique et social). The following six parties did not obtain seats in the transitional 
coalition government: ANADDE, PRP, PSD, ABASA and PARENA (the latter as it did not sign the 
agreement). Ibid, II. 
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Union Pour Ie Progres National 
Tutsi-dominated nationalist political party, established just before independence and initially 
then led by Prince Louis Rwagasore, who was central in the fight for independence and who 
was killed in October 1961. UPRONA was the state party 1966-1993. The party split in October 
1998 over the question of participation in the Arusha negotiations, fronted by Charles Mukasi 
(anti-negotiation wing) and Luc Rukingama (pro-negotiation wing). The party was supported 
by the army.183 
FRODEBU 
Front pour la Democratie au Burundi 
Hutu-dominated political party that existed since 1992 and won the vote in the first 
presidential elections in 1993. Led by Jean Minani (external wing) and Augustin Nzojibwami 
(internal wing).184 
CNDD 
Consei/ National pour la Defense de la Democratie 
Hutu-dominated group, founded and led by Leonard Nyangoma in 1994, which was one of the 
founders of FRODEBU and Minister of Interior in Ntariyamira's government in 1994.185 
CNDD-FDD 
Armed wing Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie 
Initially the armed wing of CNDD, the group led by Jean-Bosco Ndakengurukiye split from CNDD 
just before the first round of talks at Arusha.186 In October 2001, a faction of the CNDD-FDD 
rejected Ndayikengurukiye's leadership based on a disagreement about whether to engage in 
negotiations, and a splinter group called National Circle of Patriots (FDD-CNP) was formed 
with Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza as its leader.187 
PALIPEHUTU 
Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu 
Extremist Hutu party established in 1980 by Remy Gahutu and since 1990 led by Etienne 
Karatasi.188 The party was founded by Burundian refugees in Rwanda in the late 1970s.189 
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Forces Nationales de Liberation 
Due to disagreements within PALIPEHUTU on whether to support President Ndadaye, where 
radical elements did not approve of Ndadaye's policies to promote ethnic coexistence, Kabora 
Kossan, who was the military chief of PALIPEHUTU, broke away and formed his own party, 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL in 1993.190 Agathon Rwasa replaced Kabura as a leader in 2001. A group led 
by Alain Mugabarabona broke away from PALIPEHUTU-FNL in 2002 following disagreements 
between the pro-negotiation and anti-negotiation factions. PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa also had 
further defections,191 
Support base 
Together with the army, UPRONA represent the Tutsi. FROOEBU, CNOO and its armed wing 
CNOO-FOO represent the Hutu population. PALIPEHUTU and PALIPEHUTU-FNL are understood 
as more extremist Hutu parties.192 
For the Tutsi controlled army and UPRONA, "numerical weakness must be counterbalanced by 
their dominance in all spheres of public life as the only way to guarantee their survival".193 For 
the Hutu FROOEBU and CNOO-FOO, on the other hand, the issue at stake is a problem of ethnic 
exclusion. The assassination of Ndadaye was seen as a missed opportunity for inclusion and 
participation in national institutions, and instead "interpreted as an effort to wipe them 
physically off the map",194 
2.2 Participation in the Arusha process 
The first round ofthe Arusha peace process took place between the 15th and the 21st of 
June 1998 with Nyerere as mediator, and 17 parties from Burundi participated in the 
talks. Central participants were the Government of Burundi, the National Assembly, 
FROOEBU, UPRONA, CNOO, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA and PARENA. Other parties present 
were the PL, PIT, PSO, ABASA, INKINZO, AVINTWARI and PRB.195 Also civil society and 
women's and youth organisations were represented.196 The military took part "as part of 
192 Maundi et al. 2006, 63. 
191 Ibid, 64. 
194 Ibid, 65. 
195 The full names of the parties are: FRODEBU (Front pour la Democratie au Burundi), UPRONA (Union 
Nationalie Pour Ie Progres), CNDD (Conseil national pour la Defense de la Democratie), PALIPEHUTU 
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UPRONA or the government delegation" and was further drawn in as consultants on 
specific areas of the process.197 The CNDD, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA and PARENA were 
not part in the previous Convention but participated in the Arusha talks,198 and besides 
Burundian parties, actors from the United Nations, European Union, United States of 
America, Canada, Organization of African Unity, Switzerland and the religious 
community of Sant'Egidio were present.199 According to the International Crisis Group 
(lCG), participation in the negotiations was a significant achievement in itself, as it was 
the first time most of the parties to the Burundian conflict were present at negotiations, 
and "proved that the idea of negotiations had taken hold with them all".2oo Despite a 
broad participation of actors, however, the armed groups PALIPEHUTU-FNL and CNDD-
FDD did not participate at Arusha.201 
2.2.1 Participation under Nyerere 
Nyerere's approach to the participation of the armed groups has been a topic of 
discussion amongst experts on the Burundi peace process. From one perspective, 
Nyerere sought to include the armed groups but failed to do so as the armed groups and 
their political factions split. Southall argues that "attempts to make the talks fully 
inclusive fell down when early efforts to bring in Significant groups failed", and suggests 
that the problems with bringing the parties on board were essentially related to the 
parties themselves.202 Both the CNDD and the PALIPEHUTU had internal schisms with 
their armed factions, the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL respectively, and this 
naturally complicated the question of participation. The CNDD-FDD had months before 
the first talks in Arusha rejected Leonard Nyangoma as its president and instead 
appointed Jean-Bosco Ndiyikengurukiye, who had been leading its military operations. 
The rejection of Nyangoma as a valid representative was reiterated just days before the 
talks started.203 Also the PALIPEHUTU-FNL had split from their political faction before 
Arusha. 204 
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Nyerere saw four options to the problem presented by the splits between the armed and 
political factions. One was that the leaders of the armed factions join the political faction 
and accept the old leadership. A second option was that the new leaders replace the 
ones already participating, then "as leaders of their parties according to their parties' 
constitutions, and attend the talks in those elected capacities".205 The third option was 
for the new leaders to be included as representatives of new parties. A forth option was 
also considered, namely that the CNDD-FDD joined the Government delegation in the 
peace talks.206 It has been suggested that Nyerere suspected that the Government sought 
to find agreement with Ndiyikengurukiye and the CNDD-FDD as a way to avoid the 
political negotiations.207 Such an option would consequently ensure that the 
negotiations continued. It should also be noted that the Burundian army seemed more 
willing to cooperate with Ndiyikengurukiye as a leader than with Nyangoma.208 
Despite Nyerere's four suggestions, a deadlock presented itself as the both armed and 
political groups claimed to be legitimate representatives. One problem was that in 
addition to the political factions, other parties included in the process objected to the 
leaders of the armed factions being recognised. Rules of conduct had been agreed to that 
"expressly forbade" changes in representatives.209 Without finding a solution to the 
deadlock, Nyerere eventually "chose to recognize the existing leadership and to exclude 
those who had turned against them.2IO 
Tanzanian officials have argued that the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL excluded 
themselves by rejecting Nyerere's options.211 To include the armed groups without the 
support from the CNDD and PALIPEHUTU "would have invited to a walk out from the 
205 Ibid. 
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talks" by the latter, according to Bentley & SouthalP12 The other parties involved in the 
peace process also affected Nyerere's response, as Lemarchand indicates that the 
decision not to include the armed groups was influenced by pressure from the Tutsi 
parties.213 The rules of conduct referred to above could have been a foundation for such 
a pressure from the Tutsi parties, and contributed to the difficult situation Nyerere 
found himself in.214 Consequently, both the Hutu parties and the Tutsi parties would 
have problems with the armed groups being included, which strengthens the impression 
that deciding to exclude the armed groups was based on the judgement that excluding 
the parties would give have less negative effects than ifthe groups were included.215 
An alternative perspective suggests that Nyerere was influenced by his personal views 
on the armed groups and that this made him less open to recognising them as valid 
representatives.216 Tutsi delegates have argued that "Nyerere wanted the FDD and FNL 
to stay out so that the war could continue, which would thereby keep up the pressure on 
the Tutsi military establishment".217 According to Daley, the exclusion ofthe armed 
groups was based on a decision by Nyerere to refuse ((to acknowledge leaders who 
'gained power by force"'.218 Also Van Eck suggests that the armed groups ((were excluded 
in spite of their requests to be included".219 
There are consequently conflicting perspectives on why the armed groups were not 
included in the peace process in the phase led by Nyerere, and the decision to continue 
the peace process with the political factions and exclude the armed groups has been 
both criticised and supported. A number of dimensions have been raised as important: 
the concern of a walk-out of other Hutu parties, resistance from Tutsi parties, rules of 
conduct already having been agreed upon, Nyerere's views of the armed groups and 
their leadership, as well as the importance of sustaining the pressure on the army to 
ensure the continuation of peace talks. On the one hand, it is argued that Nyerere's 
212 It is also suggested that such a move would promote further splintering, which is an issue that will be 
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decision was informed by his personal perceptions of the armed groups. Southall on the 
other hand suggests that Nyerere did not intentionally exclude the CNDD-FDD and 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL,22o an argument that is supported by Maundi et al. and the ICG.221 
Most accounts indicate that Nyerere initially wanted the armed groups to participate, 
but chose to recognise the political leadership when faced with the dilemma. 
2.2.2 Participation under Mandela 
Nyerere died in October 1999, and Nelson Mandela of South Africa was appointed 
mediator in December of that year. In the meantime, the need for the armed groups to 
participate in the peace process was repeatedly stressed. In a debate in the United 
Nations Security Council on the situation in Burundi in 1999, also the Burundian 
government underlined the need for the participation of the armed groups, and claimed 
they "had persistently advocated inclusive negotiations".222 The Security Council 
commended the government and other parties for being committed to negotiations, and 
called upon the parties outside the process to end the use of violence and participate in 
the peace process.223 
Mandela's mediation approach was different to Nyerere's. Mandela was vocal and 
challenged all parties, and was consequently regarded as fair but tough.224 He was 
concerned with bringing the process to an end as soon as possible and hence stepped up 
the pressure on the parties.225 Significantly, Mandela sought to include the armed groups 
in the peace process, and two reasons explain Mandela's approach to the question of 
participation of the armed groups. 226 His stance was first of all influenced by his 
experiences from the South African peace process, and secondly, the exclusion of the 
CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL was increasingly seen as a serious flaw of the 
220 Southall 2006, 207. 
m Maundi et al. 2006, 75 and International Crisis Group 1998,4. 
222 United Nations, "Burundi situation 'precarious', steps needed to strengthen peace process Security 
Council told during day-long debate on crisis," Press Release SC/6753,12 November 1999. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999119991112.sc6753.doc.html[15 August 2008]. 
223 It is interesting to note the focus was on encouraging the parties to participate, rather than a process 
that would facilitate such participation. United Nations, "Security Council calls on parties to end violence 
in Burundi, pursue negotiation; Murder of United Nations personnel is condemned." Press Release 
SC/6754, 12 November 1999. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.un.orglNews/Press/docs/1999/19991112.sc6754.doc.html[15 August 2008]. 
224 Bentley & Southall 2005, 72. 
225 International Crisis Group 2000, i. 
226 Filip Reyntjens, "Briefing: Burundi: A Peaceful Transition after a Decade of War?" African Affairs 105, 










peace process, and their participation was considered to be necessary to bring about 
lasting peace.227 
The South African team made continued efforts to meet with the armed groups after 
Mandela took over as mediator, but faced several challenges in this process. At a 
regional summit in February 2000, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL was "prevented from 
travelling by the Tanzanian authorities on grounds that it did not have the official 
documents C ... ). As for the FDD delegation, it claimed to have a transport problem. A 
plane was then sent to them from South Africa, but they did not turn up at the 
airport".228 This suggests that there was resistance both among the parties already 
participating in the process as well as reluctance to join among the excluded parties. 
The regional dimension of the conflict further complicated the process of bringing the 
parties in. It has been suggested that the CNDD-FDD were "hostages of Kabila and his 
allies" and expected to participate in the war in the DRC.229 The CNDD-FDD was 
consequently thought to be awaiting the developments in the DRC before committing to 
the Burundian peace process. The complex nature of the regional problem again raised 
discussion about whether the peace process should go on without the CNDD-FDD. 
A dialogue with the armed groups did eventually materialise. After strong pressure, 
Mandela met with CNDD-FDD leader Ndayikengurukiye in March 2000.230 The CNDD-
FDD stated willingness to participate in the Arusha process, on the condition that 
political prisoners were released and that regroupment camps were closed.231 Also the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL agreed in principle to engage in negotiations.232 A meeting between 
Buyoya and leaders of the parties took place in South Africa in July 2000. 233 Mandela did 
not succeed in including the parties, however, and eventually decided to push the 
process forward without the groups' participation. 
The CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL were therefore not parties to the Arusha 
accord, which was signed in August 2000, and the situation was consequently a peace 
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agreement without an end to hostilities.234 Southall claims that by opening for their 
participation, the armed groups lost recognition and "enhanced the legitimacy ofthe 
subsequent Accord".235 For the agreement to last, however, a ceasefire with the armed 
groups was understood to be necessary. 
2.2.3 Participation in the post-Arusha phase 
Mandela initially believed he could find agreement with the armed groups in the time 
period between the signing of the Arusha accord and the beginning of the transitional 
period. CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL however "rejected the Arusha accord from 
which they had been excluded and demanded the reopening of negotiations.236 
Attempts to establish peace talks between the government and the armed groups 
continued by then deputy president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, and significant 
pressure was put on the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to enter ceasefire 
agreements.237 
The process of bringing the parties onboard after the signing of the Arusha Agreement 
has been described as "one of bewildering complexity, characterized by broken 
promises, violated cease-fires, and continuing war between rebel groups and the 
transitional government which continued to bring untold misery to the population",238 
and factionalism and splintering within the armed groups further complicated their 
participation in the peace process.239 After numerous meetings, ceasefire agreements 
were reached with the CNDD-FDD faction of Ndayikengurukiye and PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
led by Mugabarabona in October 2002. Later the same year, CNDD-FDD of Nkurunziza 
also entered talks with the transitional government. A year of negotiations combined 
with military activity followed, eventually culminating in the Global Ceasefire Agreement 
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between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD of Nkurunziza in November 
2003. PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa still rejected the talks.240 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa did not enter substantial negotiations with the transitional 
government despite being increasingly marginalised from 2004 onwards.241 The 
transitional period ended and elections were held in 200S, in which the CNDD-FDD of 
Nkurunziza won both the parliamentary and communal elections, and Nkurunziza was 
elected president.242 Negotiations between the government and PALIPEHUTU-FNL of 
Rwasa eventually began in June 2006, and culminated in a ceasefire agreement as a 
result of international pressure. The parties did not succeed at implementing this 
agreement, and violence flared up. In June 2008, the parties signed the Magaliesburg 
agreement in South Africa, where commitments were made to find a political solution to 
the conflict and the parties "reached an understanding on recognition of the rebel 
movement as a political party and on the integration of its combatants into government 
forces".243 The assembly of combatants began 12 July 2008, but negotiations over the 
disarmament, disarmament and reintegration process have since continued. By March 
2009, a request that PALIPEHUTU-FNL's changes its name in order to register as a 
political party remained an outstanding issue.244 
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2.3 Response to questions 
• How is an all-inclusive process defined? 
The different approaches taken in the Burundian peace process shows that the process 
was not based on a specific definition of all-inclusiveness, and does therefore not 
contribute to a clear understanding or definition of the concept. 
• Does an all-inclusive process include absolutely all parties, or is some judgement made 
as to what parties are considered relevant? 
It is evident that the way in which the question of participation was handled changed 
throughout the peace process. Significantly, only political parties participated in the 
process leading to the Convention of Government, but as the armed groups took a more 
prominent role, it was increasingly argued that they needed to be included in the peace 
process. Essentially, the understanding of who should be included changed as new 
groups became the main movers of the conflict. 
Despite the armed groups being the central actors in the conflict, they did not take part 
in the first talks at Arusha. It is unlikely that Nyerere deliberately sought to exclude the 
armed groups from the negotiations, but he did also not ensure their participation from 
the onset. Calls for the incl usion of the armed grou ps from other countries in the region 
were in other words ignored, but when the parties split from their political factions, 
Nyerere was forced to address the question of participation. By the time Mandela took 
over as a mediator, it was clear that the armed groups could not be disregarded, and 
efforts were made at bringing the parties in. Clearly, no principle of all-inclusiveness was 
applied in the peace process in Burundi. 
Considerations as to what parties were seen as relevant for the success of the peace 
process did influence the decisions made regarding participation. Attempts to include 
the armed groups were only initiated when they were understood to be significant 
players in the peace process, and especially when they split with their political factions. 
Later, as their use of violence was stepped up, it was seen as crucial to bring the parties 
onboard. 
Based on the Burundian experience, should a principle of all-inclusiveness apply, or is it 










parties are? The question raised is further complicated when considering the talks 
taking place before the Arusha process got underway. In the talks culminating in the 
Convention of Government, only the political parties were present. On the one hand, one 
can with hindsight ask ifthe armed groups should have been included in the Convention 
of Government, simply because they became significant players at a later stage. On the 
other hand, the CG was essentially aiming to solve a political crisis and establish a 
coalition government, and it is arguably natural that only political parties were included. 
As soon as the CG broke down and violence flared up, however, it was suggested that the 
armed groups had to be included in the peace process. In spite of this, the armed groups 
were not included in the mediation efforts led by Nyerere. With hindsight, Nyerere's 
assessment can be questioned, as it later became clear that the armed groups could not 
be ignored, and Mandela consequently sought to bring the parties in. To base the 
participation of parties on an assessment of what parties are relevant to the process 
seems appropriate in the Burundian case. 
• Does all-inclusiveness mean the participation of armed groups as well as political 
groups? 
In the case of Burundi, the question has a complex answer. As outlined above, the armed 
groups did not take part in the initial agreements leading up to the Arusha peace 
process, and neither in the first phase of the Arusha process led by Nyerere. Only when 
the armed groups became the central actors in the conflict was the question of their 
inclusion raised, and the issue of the participation of the armed groups remained a 
challenging one throughout the peace process. Under the auspices of Nyerere, the split 
between armed and political factions raised significant questions. One of these was the 
dilemma of whether to include the armed groups and risk the walk-out of the political 
groups, or move the process forwards with the political groups, who already were 
participants, and exclude the armed groups. As Mandela took over as mediator it had 
become increasingly evident that the armed groups had to be included in the peace 
process. The lack of all-inclusiveness was perceived as a serious flaw of the process and 
their participation was understood as central for lasting peace to be found, but despite 
Mandela attempt to include the armed groups in the peace process, this turned out to be 
difficult to achieve. The parties presented demands for their participation and despite a 










in and eventually decided to continue without them. The warring parties in the conflict 
were therefore not participating in the peace process in the phase with Mandela as a 
mediator, despite his stated intention to include them. The efforts to bring in the armed 
groups continued in the post-Arusha phase. Negotiations were initiated but were 
repeatedly interrupted and often combined with military activity, an factionalism and 
splintering of the remaining armed groups further complicated the process. 
Three important aspects regarding inclusion of armed groups can be highlighted from 
the Burundian experience. First, all-inclusiveness, or a broad participation of actors, can 
be called for, without a clear definition of what it entails. Second, it is evident that there 
may be practical problems preventing a principle of all-inclusive from being applied. 
Despite attempting to include the armed groups, neither Nyerere nor Mandela 
succeeded in bringing the parties in. Third, the central considerations in the peace 
process in Burundi were based on an understanding of who the central actors in the 
conflict were, and who were the parties who had to participate for the process to move 
forwards. In conclusion, decisions regarding the participation of armed groups were 
based on pragmatic considerations rather than a principle of all-inclusiveness with a 
defined meaning. The principle of all-inclusiveness is evidently more complex than 











The analytical framework presents a series of questions regarding the use of violence 
and participation in peace processes. It could arguably be problematic to include parties 
who are responsible for grave violations, and on this basis questions whether one 
should negotiate with such groups, but this does not present a serious challenge to the 
principle of all-inclusiveness. It is emphasised in the literature that parties who are able 
to hinder a peace process from succeeding by using violence must be included in the 
peace process, based on the assumption that violence will derail the peace process, and 
that inclusion of the relevant party will prevent this from happening. The following 
section examines lessons from the Burundian peace process with particular attention to 
participation and the use of violence. First, a general examination of the use of violence 
during the peace process is presented, before the specific questions raised are discussed. 
3.1 Violence during the Arusha negotiations 
In the Burundian peace process, exclusion of the armed groups had significant effects on 
their use of violence. Violence was stepped up as the Arusha peace process moved on 
and the stakes were raised, and especially after June 1999, violent attacks increased 
noticeably. According to Daley, the armed groups that were excluded from the Arusha 
process "made themselves significant players in less than one year. From June 1999 to 
January 2000 they became a force to be reckoned with ifpeace was to be achieved".245 
Both the PALIPEHUTU-FNL and the CNDD-FDD used violence to signal their 
dissatisfaction with being excluded from the peace process, and show their defiance 
against accepting a document they had not been negotiating,246 and the use of violence 
continued to be a "tactical move" as the negotiations progressed.247 In addition to 
military activities, all the armed groups ran recruitment campaigns in refugee camps as 
the peace process came closer to a conclusion, in order to enhance their position "before 
negotiating their integration into the army".248 Changes in tactics were also observed. As 
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the peace process continued, armed groups launched "attacks on the capital C ... ) and 
military positions with the aim of creating a siege mentality among the inhabitants of 
Bujumbura".249 One example ofthis strategy is the assassination oftwo UN personnel 
and seven Burundians in October 1999. In sum, the use of violence changed in relation 
to developments in the peace process, and as the armed groups were not seen as central 
participants in the initial stages of the peace process, but came to be perceived as such, 
there is no doubt that that the parties made themselves important to the peace process 
through the use of violence. 
3.2 Violence in the post-Arusha phase 
Violence continued in the period after the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
was signed on 28 August 2000. Indeed, the military pressure was stepped up the day 
after the accord was signed,250 and within months of the signing ofthe accord, the 
situation was described as one of war between governmental troops the PALIPEHUTU-
FNL and the CNOO-FOO, affecting most parts of the country.251 The high levels of 
violence were paralleled by ongoing efforts towards finding ceasefire agreements with 
the armed groups, and violence was the remaining groups' tool to signal that were 
unwilling to accept the Arusha Agreement because due to their exclusion from the 
negotiation process. The violence was moreover interpreted as defiance against 
sanctions issued in 2000 and finally, the violence still sought to state the importance of 
the armed groups for the survival of the peace process, as a way to enhance their 
positions.252 
The increase in violence deteriorated the humanitarian situation and also affected the 
peace process. The political landscape became more fragmented with increasingly rigid 
positions,253 and due to the state of war in most parts of the country, it became evident 
that the parties had to be included in order to bring about lasting peace. Most 
importantly, by using violence, the armed groups clearly indicated that their cooperation 
was essential for the success ofthe peace process. 
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3.3 Response to questions 
• Is avoiding to reward violence an important concern for mediators? 
Accounts of the peace process in Burundi give no indication that the mediators were 
reluctant to include the armed groups in the peace process because it would imply an 
unwanted reward for the use of violence. Nyerere's main concern was with the 
consequences the inclusion of the armed groups would have, in particular the likely 
walk-out by the political parties. Contrary to displaying a concern for possible negative 
effects of including the armed groups, Mandela actively sought to include them in the 
process after he took over as mediator. In sum, it seems that pragmatic concerns were 
prominent in the decision-making regarding the participation of armed groups in the 
peace process. 
• Does including a party prevent it from hindering a peace process' progress? 
The Burundi peace process shows that there is no automatic link between including a 
party and a reduced ability or willingness to hinder the peace process. On the contrary, 
as pressure put on the parties to participate, their position seemed to have been 
strengthened. As a result, negotiations were ongoing while the violence continued. 254 
• When does the use of violence hinder the progress of a peace process? 
In the case of Burundi, the peace process' success was understood to be dependent on 
the participation of the armed groups because of their use of violence. Despite their 
initial exclusion, they were eventually brought in, and it is therefore impossible to know 
if the peace process could have succeeded without accommodating the armed groups in 
any way. At the period of the Arusha peace process, the use of violence was significant, 
especially in the period between June 1999 and January 2000, when the armed groups 
used violence to show their dissatisfaction with being excluded from the process.255 No 
accounts do however indicate that the use of violence did in fact represent a serious 
threat to the peace process' prospects for progress. 
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With hindsight, it is evident that the use of violence did not hinder the progress of the 
peace process, as the Arusha agreement was signed in August 2000. The use of violence 
did however present a significant challenge to the progress ofthe process in the post-
Arusha phase. As outlined above, the use of violence increased shortly after the 
agreement was signed, and within a few months, the situation was one of war in most 
parts ofthe country.256 It is evident that the situation had serious impacts on the 
implementation of the Arusha accord, and it became clear that the armed groups had to 
be accommodated in order to bring about lasting peace. 










4. Consequences of exclusion 
As discussed in the framework chapter, it is a commonly held belief that parties who are 
excluded from a peace process will spoil the peace process. It is suggested that the 
appropriate strategy to deal with spoiling behaviour will depend on whether the party's 
demands are legitimate or not, but equally relevant, whether the party is able to hinder 
the peace process from succeeding. Several consequences of exclusion are highlighted, 
and it is suggested in the literature that parties who are excluded are likely to become 
extremists. The following section examines the Burundian experience with regards to 
consequences of excluding a party from a peace process. 
4.1 Implications of excluding armed groups 
Nyerere's decision to move on without the participation of the armed groups was to 
have significant impacts on the peace process, and six aspects should be highlighted in 
this regard. 
First, the lack of CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL participation slowed down the 
progress of the Arusha process.257 The exclusion of the armed groups and their 
continued use of violence prolonged the peace process and the armed conflict. 258 
Essentially, "the major elements of the FDD and FNL ( ... ) remained at war, at odds with 
the Arusha process".259 The most obvious implication of the exclusion of the armed 
groups was therefore a situation that was described as "neither war nor peace".260 Due 
to the "absence of a ceasefire" the Arusha Agreement could not be "backed up by a UN 
peacekeeping force".261 
Second, the initial exclusion ofthe armed groups did essentially increase their 
bargaining power. Excluded due to their split with their political counterparts, the 
armed groups were again offered to join two years into the Arusha process, when 
257 Another element contributing to the lack of progress were the perceptions within the Tutsi delegation 
of Nyerere being biased. Southall 2006, 207. 
2.S8 Van Eck 2007, 116. 
259 Southall 2006, 207. 
260 International Crisis Group 2000a. 
261 International Crisis Group, "Burundi: One Hundred Days to put the Peace Process Back on Track." ICG 
Africa Report No. 33.14 August 2001a. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.crisisgroup.orgllibrary/documents/africa/central africa/033 burundi 100 days to put the 










Mandela took over as a mediator. The groups first declined to participate and later 
presented a series of demands as preconditions for their participation.262 A significant 
barrier to their participation was that the armed groups "wanted an alternative 
negotiating process since Arusha neither addressed their major concern, Burundi army 
reform, not gave them a seat at the political 'high table' through which to push their 
broader security sector agenda".263 
Third, the exclusion of the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL contributed to the 
growing radicalisation of the groupS.264 The outsiders considered themselves as having a 
higher moral ground as they held on to the original aims, while those who had signed 
the Arusha Agreement were seen as sell-outs due to having made compromises.265 The 
parties that were included in the Arusha process on the other hand claimed that there 
was no need to include the outsiders as they shared the same objectives, and the 
question was in other words framed as one of representativeness by those included in 
the process. Van Eck suggests, however, that the groups did not have the same demands, 
and that such claims further increased the armed groups' reluctance to participate in the 
peace process.266 
Forth, the exclusion of the armed groups resulted in a need to redistribute "positions in 
the institutions" given to those who were already included,267 a reshuffling that 
generally positioned Hutu against Tutsi, as the significant Tutsi parties were all included 
in the Arusha process.268 
Fifth, the decision to exclude the armed groups from the initial stages ofthe peace 
process had serious ramifications for their willingness to enter the process later. At a 
press conference in July 2001, CNDD-FDD's Ndayikengurukiye judged the Arusha 
Agreement to be a total failure as "Buyoya was negotiating with himself, on the other 
side there was nothing".269 In other words, the exclusion from Arusha process prevented 
the CNDD-FDD from participating even in the Post-Arusha phase. Van Eck similarly 
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argues that the decision to move the Arusha process forward without the armed groups 
/lmade it even more difficult to bring the FNL to the negotiating table".27o 
Sixth, the implementation of the peace process is significantly challenged by the fact that 
the various parties have signed different agreements.271 Even as the remaining armed 
groups have all come to agreement with the government and laid down arms, the overall 
peace process has been affected by the decisions made regarding the participation of the 
armed groups. The fact that the parties are not committed to the same agreement is 
central in this regard, and in addition, it has been argued that the legitimacy of the 
process was seriously undermined by the exclusion of the armed groups.272 
There is no doubt that the question of inclusion and exclusion was a significant one, and 
that the decisions made were to have wide consequences for the peace process. The 
Arusha peace process has been described as /lunimpressive to say the least" because of 
the continued violence and the process being /lparalysed by the refusal of the main rebel 
groups to take part in it".273 In a similar vein, Van Eck claims that the agreement was 
flawed because it did not include central armed groups to the conflict,274 while leG 
suggests that the /lmain virtue of the signature of the Arusha accord was that is closed a 
cycle of negotiations, whose formula (i.e. including all the political parties but not the 
main armed groups) had reached its limits",275 Despite it flaws, the peace process 
should be assessed as Bentley & Southall view it, namely that the Arusha agreement 
provided a significant basis for peace in Burundi, and that the accord was not 
/lfundamentally flawed by the absence of key rebel groupS".276 
4.2 Response to questions 
• Does exclusion result in the party using spoiling tactics? 
There is no doubt that spoiling tactics was a direct consequence of the exclusion of the 
armed groups in the Burundian peace process. As described in the previous section, the 
use of violence was significantly stepped up and led to a state of war in many parts of the 
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country, and the parties used violence strategically to emphasise their importance for 
the success of the peace process. It seems, however, that the majority of the armed 
groups essentially sought to influence the process rather than derailing it. The armed 
groups used violence to indicate their defiance against the Arusha agreement, which 
they had not been part in negotiating and would consequently not sign. Violence was 
moreover utilised to strengthen their position and negotiating power. In sum, violence 
was both used strategically to show their importance for Burundi's future, a tool to 
improve their negotiating positions as well as a tactical move to influence the 
negotiating framework. 
The position taken by PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa indicates that the party was not really 
willing to engage, and there are therefore reasons to believe that the party sought to 
spoil the peace process and not merely influence it by using violence. In May 2008, 
Rwasa requests ultimately indicated that he would "only play ball on his own terms'',277 
and even after the Magaliesburg agreement was signed in June 2008, disagreements 
were voiced regarding the assembly of combatants. The PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa 
demanded acceptance as a political party as a prerequisite for the process to continue, 
while the government claimed that the PALIPEHUTU-FNL continued to recruit fighters, 
and that "the rebel group [was] preparing itself for the resumption of hostilities".278 As 
late as In January 2009, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL finally agreed to change its name in order 
to meet the requirements to become a political party. Although described as a 
"breakthrough", translating the cooperation "into concrete political and military steps 
such as the socio-economic integration of FNL troops" was seen as necessary to resolve 
the remaining issues.279 The party's commitment to peace can arguably be questioned 
due to the drawn-out efforts to find an agreement and take steps to implement 
agreements reached. 
In sum, the exclusion from the peace process did lead to spoiling tactics in the case of 
Burundi. In particular, the use of violence and spoiling was used in response to being 
excluded and the majority of the parties were essentially concerned with influencing the 
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peace process rather than spoiling it. There are, however, reasons to question if the 
spoiling behaviour of PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa was a consequence of its exclusion 
from the process, as the group has not demonstrated a clear willingness to engage in the 
peace process. 
• Are parties included as longs as their demands are legitimate, regardless o/their 
spoiling behaviour? 
It is evident that the demands held by the various parties were less important for their 
participation in the peace process than was their ability to use violence. The political 
parties were included from the very beginning, not because of their views but as result 
of Nyerere's perception that they were the legitimate representatives, and the 
assessmentthatthatthe inclusion ofthe political groups at the expense of the armed 
groups would be less damaging to the process than the other way around. In the 
Burundian peace process, the main concern for the issue of participation was the ability 
of parties to hinder the process, and not with the legitimacy of their demands. 
• Do mediators ignore parties (use the departing train strategy) who undermine the 
peace process and hold illegitimate demands? 
• Are parties being included, regardless o/their demands, if they are able to undermine 
the peace process? 
In the Burundian peace process, the parties who were excluded did attempt to 
undermine the peace process, especially by using violence. Whether they held 
illegitimate demands or not was not a concern to the mediators. Contrary to what is 
suggested in the literature, the mediators involved did not use the departing train 
strategy in response, but rather sought to include the parties in the process, because of 
their attempts to undermine the peace process. 
• Are small or radical parties marginalised in response to their spoiling behaviour? 
As previously mentioned, the size or views held by the parties did not affect the way in 
which they were handled by the mediators, and their ability to hinder the peace process 
was the significant concern that guided the question of inclusion and exclusion. 










• Does inclusion o/parties with extreme positions result in the party holding more 
moderate views? 
In the case of Burundi, it has been argued that he parties who did not take part in the 
peace process took more extreme positions as a result of being excluded, but did not 










5. Characteristics of parties 
As highlighted in the analytical framework, the orthodoxy of all-inclusiveness fails to 
recognise several dimensions regarding the characteristics of parties that presumably 
matter for the question of participation and needs to be examined in practice. In 
particularly, this concerns the willingness of parties to participate as well as the 
assumption that parties are unitary actors. With these issues in mind, the following 
section will address some practical issues regarding the participation of all parties. 
5.1 Factionalism and participation in the Arusha process 
Factionalism, splinter groups and new party formations were central challenges in the 
peace process in Burundi, and changes in the composition ofthe parties did directly 
influence the decisions made regarding participation. The PALIPEHUTU, established in 
1980, split when Cos san Kabura broke away and formed PALIPEHUTU-FNL in 1992.280 
The CNDD-FDD first split as the party's military branch, led by Jean-Bosco 
Ndayikengurukiye, separated from its political branch, led by Leonard Nyangoma, just 
before the first round oftalks at Arusha.281 The split in the CNDD-FDD followed 
accusations that the leadership was misappropriating funds, or at least ofthe bad 
management and redistribution of existing resources".282 Due to developments in the 
neighbouring DRC, the CNDD-FDD was forced to move its bases to Tanzania, and the 
process resulted in a loss of significant resources such as medical equipment and 
financial resources, which ICG suggests was the background for the internal divisions. 283 
The splits between the political and armed factions of central parties presented a 
significant challenge for the question of participation, and as already mentioned, four 
options were outlined as possible solutions. A deadlock remained, however, and Nyerere 
eventually decided to move on without the armed groups. Factionalism was therefore a 
direct cause of the exclusion of the armed groups from the peace process, and the armed 
groups were consequently not signatories to the Arusha Agreement. PALIPEHUTU was 
represented by Etienne Karatasi at Arusha, while PALIPEHUTU-FNL, led by Cossan 
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Kabura, did not participate and continued its armed struggle.284 Whereas the CNDD did 
agree to the Declaration signed after the first round of talks at Arusha, its military 
branch CNDD-FDD rejected it and further "issued a warning "to those that continue to 
conclude agreements in the name of the CNDD".28S As a result, the ceasefire agreement 
reached on 21 June 1998 led nowhere. 286 Indeed, it was widely recognised that it would 
be necessary to bring the armed groups onboard should Burundi see lasting peace, and 
it was argued that "the FDD would inevitably have to be invited to the negotiation table" 
should the armed group persistently reject Nyangoma as a valid representative.287 
5.2 Splintering in the post-Arusha phase 
After the Arusha Agreement was signed, efforts continued to bring in the remaining 
groups. More than 20 meetings took place between September 2000 and the beginning 
of 2003, and one of the significant challenges to the process was continued factionalism 
and splintering of the armed groupS.288 Giving the groups "equality of status led to a 
proliferation of parties and may well have contributed to factionalism within the rebel 
movements".289 
The question around participation in negotiations was to cause further factionalism in 
the CNDD-FDD. In October 2001, the group confirmed its commitment to an agenda for 
negotiations with the government, but the day after a summit in Pretoria in October 
2001, a faction of the CNDD-FDD rejected Ndayikengurukiye's leadership, took control 
over large parts of the forces and formed a splinter group that called itself National 
Circle of Patriots (FDD-CNP). The group established a central committee and Jean-Pierre 
Nkurunziza became coordinator-generaP9o This FDD-CNP did take part in talks held at 
Vaal Dam in South Africa in February 2002, where some progress was made towards 
establishing a framework for continued talks with the government,291 but when CNDD-
FDD of Ndayikengurukiye participated in talks in April 2002, Nkurunziza's faction 
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"declined to participate unless the South African facilitators rejected their immediate 
rivals", and argued for the negotiations to continue in Tanzania when Zuma refused. 292 
As for the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, little progress was achieved. In 2001, Agathon Rwasa 
replaced Kabura as a leader for PALIPEHUTU-FNL. Rwasa continued to refuse a 
ceasefire agreement, despite engaging in "official or unofficial talks with facilitators, 
[and] held strongly to the position that the transitional government was dominated by 
Tutsis, that Hutu parties which had joined it were sell-outs, and that it would only 
negotiate with the Burundian army".293 
After successful cooperation on the battlefield, a partnership took shape between the 
FDD-CNP of Nkurunziza and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, but the parties found themselves in 
disagreement when the FDD-CDP attempted "to take the lead on the talks and to assert 
that they are mandated to represent the FNL ( ... )".294In 2002, there were increasing 
tensions between pro-negotiation and anti-negotiation factions of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
and later in the same year, a small faction led by Alain Mugabarabona broke away from 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL. It is worth noting that the PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa also had 
further defections.295 
In 2002, four armed groups therefore remained outside the peace process and central in 
the conflict; 
1. The CNDD-FDD of Ndayikengurukiye; 
2. The FDD-CNP of Nkurunziza; 
3. PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Mugabarabona; and 
4. PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa. 
Of these, the most active were the PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa and FDD-CNP of 
Nkurunziza. 296 
As the peace process was dependent on the participation and support of the armed 
groups, the facilitators were to a large extent forced to engage with whatever party was 
willing. The participation strategy did therefore not confine itself to certain parties or 
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certain principles, and was rather seeking any progress possible with any group. Indeed, 
the groups were engaged both collectively and individually.297 This strategy of multi-
track negotiations was in other words the only possible option,298 and splits and new 
party formations did therefore further complicate the post-Arusha peace process, 
especially as it limited the strategies available to the facilitators. 
When mediators engaged with certain armed groups, this served to strengthen the 
groups who remained outside ofthe process. Leaders of armed groups who did engage 
in talks were understood to be "compromising with the Buyoya regime", they were 
((rejected by some of their fellow fighters",299 and the continued non-participation of 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa consequently provided ((an exit option for unhappy 
fighters".30o 
As outlined above, a ceasefire agreement was eventually reached with the CNDD-FDD of 
Ndayikengurukiye and PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Mugabarabona in October 2002. Later the 
same year, FDD-CNP of Nkurunziza also entered talks with the transitional government, 
and signed the Global Ceasefire Agreement with the transitional government in 2003. No 
agreement was found with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Rwasa until June 2008, and the 
process of implementation is in March 2009 still faced with significant challenges. 
5.3 Response to questions 
• Is it practically possible to have an all-inclusive process? 
• Do mediators include all factions and splinter groups in the peace process? 
The Burundian peace process shows that repeated factionalism, splintering and new 
party formations pose significant practical challenges to the principle of all-
inclusiveness. The initial factionalism between the political and armed groups presented 
the mediator with a difficult dilemma, namely to either include the political leadership 
or to include the armed groups. Nyerere was willing to include all factions, and this was 
one of the options he presented to the parties, but as one party's participation depended 
on the other's exclusion, it was impossible for the mediator to include all. To have an all-
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inclusive process once the process had started without some of the groups consequently 
proved difficult in the case of Burundi. 
Later in the process, as it became obvious that the armed groups would have to be 
included, continued factionalism and splintering presented the mediators with 
additional challenges. Splintering and factionalism made the landscape of parties more 
complex and added new players that would have to be engaged, and moreover limited 
the strategies available to the mediators. 
As mentioned above, the CNDD-FDD of Nkurunziza demanded the mediator's rejection 
of its rival group as a precondition for participation. Despite wanting to include all the 
groups in peace talks, the mediators were forced to deal with whoever was willing to 
engage, and the remaining parties continued to provide a way out for fighters who were 
unhappy with their leaders joining the peace process, and the inclusion of one group 
consequently led to the strengthening of a remaining group. Based on the experience in 
the Burundian case, it is evident that the goal of including all is more problematic than 










6. Consequences of all-inclusiveness 
The analytical framework highlighted several possible consequences of having an all-
inclusive process, including complications resulting from having a high number of 
participants as well as possible problems following of a stated goal of all-inclusiveness. 
The following section examines the case of Burundi with particular attention given to 
these dimensions. As the Burundian peace process was not an all-inclusive process, it 
cannot provide lessons regarding the consequences of such an approach. 
• Does a high number of parties included in a peace process negatively affect the peace 
process and its outcome? 
The Burundian peace process did have a high number of parties involved. 17 parties 
took part in the first round ofthe Arusha peace process, and the number of parties 
participating in the peace process was in other words high even without the 
participation ofthe armed groups. The negotiations were however eased by the 
grouping of the Hutu and Tutsi parties in two camps. The agreements reached with the 
armed groups were essentially ceasefire agreements and the most difficult part was 
getting the parties to end their violent struggle. 
• Do a mediator's attempts at including all parties lead to factionalism, splintering and 
new party formations? 
The strategies chosen for the inclusion and exclusion of parties in the Burundian peace 
process had important impacts for factionalism and splintering of parties. As a direct 
consequence ofthe CNDD-FDD committing to negotiations with the government, a 
faction rejected the groups' leadership and formed a splinter group with large parts of 
the forces of the original group. It has in fact been suggested that the aim of including the 
armed groups may have contributed to further factionalism. 
Another consequence of the attempt to include the armed groups after first having 
excluded them was the armed groups' awareness of their strengthened positions when 
Mandela insisted on their inclusion in the process. As the ICG describes it; they were 










process".301 The exclusion ofthe armed groups, later was followed by attempts at 
including them, increased the room available to make demands. 











This chapter first established that the conflict in Burundi is a political one, where the 
competition for state power has been dominated by violence since the country gained 
independence in 1962. 
The question of participation in the Arusha peace process, which was initiated in 1998, 
was influenced by central events and developments during the conflict. Particularly 
important is the fact that although the armed groups had become the main movers of the 
conflict, they were not included in the mediation efforts led by Nyerere. A dilemma 
presented itself as the armed and political factions of the main parties split, and Nyerere 
did not succeed at finding a solution that was acceptable to all and eventually continued 
the peace process without the armed groups. 
As it became increaSingly evident that the armed groups could not be ignored, Mandela 
attempted to bring the warring parties into the process when he took over as mediator 
in 1999. The efforts failed, however, and Mandela decided to continue the process 
without them. The armed groups were consequently not parties to the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement, which was signed in 2000, but continued efforts at finding 
agreement with the parties those that remained outside and in opposition to the peace 
process eventually brought fruit. 
The chapter next discussed the Arusha peace process through an examination of five 
topics: The principle of an inclusive process; the use of violence; the consequences of 
exclusion; characteristics of the parties; and the consequences of an all-inclusive 
process. The following central findings emerged: 
1. All-inclusiveness 
The peace process in Burundi did not apply a set definition of all-inclusiveness and the 
parties' demands were not significant for the decisions made regarding participation. 
The question of inclusion was based on an assessment of who the central parties were 











The parties made themselves important players by the use of violence. The armed 
groups used violence in response to their exclusion from the process, and as a result, 
they were sought included in the process. 
The Burundian peace process does not indicate that including a party prevents it from 
hindering a peace process. On the contrary, the case of Burundi suggests that parties can 
be involved in negotiations and at the same time continue their use of violence, and the 
Burundian experience indicates that attempting to include armed groups as a result of 
their use of violence strengthened their position. 
With hindsight, it is evident that the use of violence did not hinder the progress of the 
peace process, as the Arusha agreement was indeed signed without the armed groups 
being parties to it. The use of violence did however challenge the implementation of the 
peace process, as the violence was increased and the country found itself in a state of 
war. 
3. Consequences of exclusion 
The decision to exclude the armed groups from the first phase ofthe peace process was 
to have Significant impact on the process in several ways. It slowed down the progress of 
the peace process, and the absence of a ceasefire hindered the support from a United 
Nations peacekeeping force. The exclusion of the armed groups moreover contributed to 
their radicalisation, and exclusion from the Arusha peace process did reduce the parties' 
willingness to engage also in the post-Arusha phase. An increase in violence and spoiling 
tactics were observed as a result of exclusion. The posts already divided between the 
included parties had to be reshuffled, and the fact that the parties have signed different 
agreements is complicating the implementation process. 
4. Characteristics of parties 
Factionalism was a direct reason for the exclusion of the armed groups from the peace 
process, and it is also suggested that giving the armed groups equal status when 
attempting to include them in the post-Arusha phase also may have contributed to 
factionalism. The mediators had to involve whoever was willing to talk, and when one 










outside the process. The Burundian peace process shows that repeated factionalism, 
splintering and new party formations pose significant practical challenges to the 
principle of all-inclusiveness. 
5. Consequences of an all-inclusive process 
The peace process in Burundi shows that the principle of all-inclusiveness may have 
important consequences, amongst them the danger of promoting factionalism and 











The central aim of this study was to question the conventional wisdom in the literature 
on peace processes that all-inclusiveness is required for a peace process to be successful, 
and it emerged that the orthodoxy of all-inclusiveness has a weak theoretical and 
empirical basis and hence needed to be examined. Five themes were discussed to this 
end: The principle of all-inclusiveness, violence, consequences of exclusion, 
characteristics of parties and consequences of all-inclusiveness. The examination of the 
Burundian peace process provided important lessons relevant for the question of 
participation. The following are the central issues and findings: 
First, it is clear that the issues involved in the participation of parties in peace processes 
are much more complex than recognised in the literature. Two questions stand out as 
particularly important: (a) There is a need to identify what is meant by all-inclusiveness. 
Does it mean including all parties, also the warring parties? The experience from 
Burundi clearly shows that all parties are not always included in peace processes. (b) 
The assumption that all-inclusiveness adds some value in itself, such as ownership and 
legitimacy, and that this will in turn ensure a successful process, is not backed up with 
evidence form case studies and should consequently be questioned. 
Second, one ofthe few critical questions about participation is whether parties should 
not be included due to being perpetrators of violence and human rights abuses. The 
question was certainly not a concern in the peace process in Burundi. 
Third, the relationship between participation and the use of violence needs to be 
examined closer, as central assumptions were not supported in the findings from the 
examination ofthe Burundian peace process: (a) Will an all-inclusive process reduce the 
parties' use of violence and hence lead to a successful process? In the case of Burundi, 
the offer to participate did not end the armed groups' use of violence. Rather, they were 
involved in negotiations while violence continued, and used violence to increase their 
bargaining power. (b) Do all violence hinder a peace process from succeeding? The 
Burundian process shows that this is not the case, as the Arusha Peace and 










was stepped up after the agreement was signed, the parties were drawn into the 
process, and it is therefore not possible to answer how much violence a peace process 
can handle based on the case of Burundi. 
Fourth, regarding consequences of the exclusion of parties, several important elements 
emerged: (a) It is claimed that parties who are excluded from a peace process become 
spoilers, and in the Burundian case, the increased use of violence was a direct 
consequence of exclusion. The parties were however seeking to influence the process as 
well as its outcome rather than to hinder the process from succeeding. It is suggested in 
the literature that appropriate strategies for dealing with spoilers should take the 
legitimacy of their demands into account. In the Burundian peace process, the demands 
of the parties were irrelevant in the consideration of participation, and the central 
concern was the parties' ability to upset the process by using violence. (b) Do parties 
who are excluded from a peace process become radicalised? This claim is supported in 
the examination of Burundi, where the exclusion ofthe CNDD-FDD and the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL contributed to their growing radicalisation, as they perceived 
themselves to hold a higher moral standing than those who chose to participate. (c) In 
Burundi, the decision to first move on without the participation of the armed groups 
gave them room for demands when they were sought included at a later stage. This 
strategy moreover slowed down the progress of the peace process. The parties who 
were included were reluctant towards the inclusion ofthe excluded parties, and when 
new parties were eventually included, this resulted in a need to reshuffle posts that had 
already been distributed. The fact that the armed groups were initially excluded and 
later included moreover resulted in the parties involved have not signed the same 
agreement. The Burundian peace process consequently highlight several important 
implications, especially ifthe decision to exclude certain parties are attempted reversed 
at a later stage. 
Sixth, about the nature of the groups: The doctrine of all-inclusiveness disregards the 
complex nature of parties in today's conflicts. The fact that parties often are many and 
have an incoherent structure, often have different factions and even split and form new 
parties represent significant challenges for the principle of including all, and the 
Burundian peace process underlines the importance of this dimension. Factionalism 










factions were not willing to all be participants. As it became clear that also the armed 
groups had to be included, all factions were invited to participate, both under Mandela 
and in the post-Arusha phase. The central question was not, however, whether they 
should all be included, but how to convince them to participate, and the repeated 
splintering of the groups presented the mediators with no choice but to engage with 
whomever was willing. Moreover, if a group chose to participate in the process, there 
was a real danger that a remaining group would be strengthened as a direct result. It is 
evidently clear that the goal of including all parties is much more complex in practice 
than suggested in the literature, as a result of factionalism and splintering. 
Finally, what are the consequences of an all-inclusive process? It has been suggested 
that the attempt to include all warring parties in the Burundian peace process did 
contribute to factionalism and new party formations, but it is impossible to draw 
absolute conclusions based on the accounts available. 
To conclude, the peace process in Burundi provides useful lessons regarding inclusion 
and exclusion. It supports the need to include parties who are able to use high levels of 
violence, as the use of violence can pose significant threats to a peace process, but not 
necessarily so. Excluding parties can result in spoiling behaviour, and the party may use 
violence as a tool to influence the peace process rather than derailing it. When 
responding to a spoiler, the demands made by the warring group are less important than 
its ability to use violence. 
The number of parties involved in a conflict and the problem with factionalism and 
splintering represent practical problems for an all-inclusive approach, and so do parties 
who are unwilling to participate. Both are highlighted in the case of Burundi, and it is 
evident that a number of obstacles to all-inclusiveness exist in practice. Significantly, the 
Burundian peace process shows that an all-inclusive process is not necessary for a peace 
process to be successful. The doctrine a/all-inclusiveness is significantly challenged by the 
Burundian peace process, and the question a/participation is more complex than 
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